The Rise and Fall of Sparta Following the Great Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.)

"Can someone explain to me how mighty Sparta was finally subdued?" 

(question posed by roland678, reddit.com; /r/history)

My humble response:

"After her victory in the Great Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) against the Athenians and her allies, Sparta became the regional hegemon. Instead of remaining insular, as was her typical foreign policy orientation up to the war, Sparta exercised a more adventurous and aggressive posture towards the Peloponnese and greater Greece. Two major developments arrested Spartan aggrandizement: (1) Persian resistance and (2) the rise of Thebes.

Following the defeat of Athens in 404 B.C., the Spartans emerged as the leading Greek city-state and, led by Lysander, the Spartan hero-general of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans acted to subdue the Greek world. In addition to her mainland aspirations, Sparta engaged in an risky foreign endeavor in the heartland of the Persian empire. Along with a host of other soldiers drawn from the Greek world, the Spartans supported the rebellion of the Persian satrap Cyrus who aimed to dethrone the new Persian king, Artaxerxes II, whose recent ascension in 404 B.C. purportedly offered to Cyrus and his Greek mercenaries an opportunity to grab absolute power. Such was not the case. This rebellion ended disastrously for Cyrus: he died. His hired Greek mercenary army faired no better. The Greek army suffered a total defeat in battle and were forced into a hasty retreat from ancient Babylon, the whole while victim to harrassment by Persian cavalry upon its flank and rear. These events were chronicled in detail by a Greek soldier, Xenophon, who was present during the initial campaign and pitiable conclusion (see:Anabasis). 

In spite of her overseas misfortunes, Sparta nonetheless continued to pursue an aggressive domestic policy vis. a v. her immediate Greek city-state neighbors. Accordingly, an anti-Spartan alliance was formed by a resurgent Athens -- supported financially and materially by, yes, the Persians -- Corinth, Argos (Sparta's historical and mortal enemy), and Thebes. These formerly self-interested city-states fought to free themselves from Sparta's hegemonic aspirations. Events culminated in the Corinthian War (395-386 B.C.), the conclusion of which saw the Spartans reaching an accommodation with the Persians who had supported the anti-Spartan alliance with financial and material support during the war. This accommodation, so called the King's Peace, guaranteed Persian control of the Greek city-states in Anatolia, on the one hand, and Spartan hegemony of the Greek mainland, on the other.

Following the Corinthian War, a formerly second-rate Boetian power, Thebes, rose to challenge Spartan aggression. Led by the statesmen and generals Epamanondas and Pelopidas, Thebes engaged in a warring struggle with Sparta. The two powers, and their respective allies, fought intermittently for a decade, but superior Theban generalship subdued the mighty Spartan army, poignantly so in two separately decisive land battles: the Battle of Leuctra (371 B.C.), and the Battle of Mantinea (362 B.C.). Thebes leveraged her victories by freeing the Spartan helots -- a subjugated class of local slaves who were both crucial for, and a threat to, the Spartan way of life --, thereafter establishing them as freemen somewhere on the Corinthian Gulf.

At this point, Spartan prestige and material dominance both depreciated. In hindsight, however, Theban ascendancy proved to be a Pyrrhic development: strong relative to her Greek neighbors, Thebes nonetheless exposed herself to the machinations of her menacing neighbor to the north, Macedon. In an ironic reversal of fortunes, Philip II of Macedon learned valuable lessons from the progressive military tactics pursued by the Thebans under Epamonondas. Philip coupled these tactics with a professional army and a deft foreign policy in order to ultimately subdue the Greek world.

Spartan dominance -- in-and-of-itself a short-lived reality -- stemmed from her overwhelming defeat of the Athenian empire during the Great Peloponnesian War. Instead of consolidating her dominant position in Greece, Sparta reoriented her foreign and domestic policies toward a more uncharacteristically aggressive position. Her example, and many more from historical records, have shown that expansion based upon hubris can have disastrous effects. Outright defeat overseas jolted the Spartan state. Her mainland posture elicited an immediate -- no less damaging -- and determined response from, inter alia, the Athenians, Argives, Thebans, and Persians. Spartan material power eroded after a period of inter-Greek warfare which, incidentally, paved the way for Macedonian hegemony."

Thanks to roland678 for piquing my interest in this intriguing period of antiquity. More to come on this topic, for sure, very soon. So stay tuned!

-Cato

Random Thoughts Upon (Still) Desperate Times

     (cont'd) The American republic - the rule of law more specifically - needs to be reinvigorated. We need a new constitution. Legal integrity needs to be upheld with a degree of vigilance similar to republican Rome: lying in court (perjury) was considered so heinous an act that the guilty person would be thrown to their death from a cliff onto a jagged rock. Marion Jones lied during a Department of Justice inquiry and was given a slap on the wrist. If caught accepting bribes while serving as a public servant, Roman officials would first have their nose cut off before they were stuffed and sewn into a large bag with a wild animal and then finally tossed into a raging river to either drown to death or eaten by the animal. 

     I surely do not recommend we resuscitate these punishments from antiquity to lend more legitimacy to our legal system. However, the modern American legal system is plagued by double-standards, biases, dishonestly, and a faithlessness that is so acute that the entire system is seen by most Americans as a vehicle to be manipulated by actors within society instead of the other way around. 

     We need to end the "Tyranny of the Legislature": implement consecutive term-limits for Senators and Representatives in order to nip the "re-election" effort in the bud. Or we could elect Congressmen for terms to take place in the future instead of soon after ballots are cast. Even better, anonymous elections! Sure, we've have great presidents, but republics are not sustained by the executive branch. Rather, it was the sage legislators such as the Spartan Lycurgus or the Athenians Solon or Draco whose cool-headed, systemic organization of republican institutions gave to posterity an ideal to marvel at and imitate. 

     Today, the solutions to most of the problems that plague our economy, society, and political institutions reveal themselves with little to no effort. In other words, we know how to succeed as a nation - or at the very least how to control the damage - yet Congress is unwilling to act. In effect, Congress can not do its job! And yet we tolerate Congressional incompetence because we either believe no remedy exists or that the status quo works well enough. On both counts we are mistaken. 

     I understand that dramatic changes to, inter alia, our tax code, Electoral College, capital and financial debt markets, etc., should be implemented with care in order to avoid unnecessary shocks to society. But for the love of all that you hold dear: When are we going to control our nation's fucking debt!?!? When, if ever, will Congress reconfigure the nation's social safety nets in order to ensure either their affordability on the one hand, or control the runaway prices of services on the other? It's incredible. Our nation's Constitution is a quaint reminder of what a republican ideal used to be. "Oh, what a nice document! How peculiar!?" or we simultaneously cling to that mythical belief that ours' is the most just and free republic while we see with our own eyes how our institutions have grown hollow and corrupt. The checks, balances, and restrictions placed within and upon our republican form of government are overridden and side-stepped by an elite class of plutocrats to whom corporate bodies owe their allegiance, and vice versa. What our republic once was and what it is today are two wholly different things and, sadly, no effort to revive the former by rebuilding the latter has sprung to life. 

     The Arab spring of recent years and contemporary protests in Turkey and Brazil have shown us how to right these wrongs. What's more, we laud the courageous efforts of the citizens from these states as they demanded honest representation through democratic activism. They bled and often died for the republican ideal. "Good for them! They are taking back their democracy," we say but then turn off the television and think of those lessons no more. Our jobs and the paychecks they deliver dictate how we define our republic. To be certain, work and pay are necessary, but there exists a short list of ideals to which we as a community should strive to realize and maintain; republicanism is at the top of that list. Material things, money, and social status can neither - for the most part - nourish our conscience nor fulfill our desire to find an answer or meaning to life. A smaller paycheck or less affluent lifestyle are paltry trade-offs for the enjoyment of true liberty, active democracy, and healthy republican institutions. When and if we shift our focus to demand these types of priorities, then we will see how far we have strayed from the path of philosophical righteousness. But what will it take for that threshold to be crossed? 

     The body-politic in the U.S. is activated by a fitful and sputtery motor. High voter turnout is no longer driven by the issues of the day, but by the race or gender of the President, or the raging public/private civil wars at the state and local levels. "Politics," to all intents, constructions, and purposes, has leap-frogged the idea of being divisive or a 'touchy' subject; to fish for a political discussion in most social circles is to invite disaster, punish oneself, be ironic, etc. To talk about politics is to talk about a naturally distasteful subject. Could I think of a warning sign, a red-flag more indicative of a dying body-politic? Other than a coup, I think not. 

     Our aspirations and actions look to me like Eisenberg's electron in his elegant "Uncertainty Principle": chaotic in nature, an electron moves around its shell, or the electron cloud, in a purely random fashion. In order for a scientist to observe that electron during its fitful travels, he must observe that electron in a single instant, like a camera snapshot. Viewed in this way, the scientist can observe the electron with remarkable clarity. And yet, because the scientist is viewing the electron frozen in time, he must therefore forfeit his ability to observe the speed at which the electron is moving, or in what direction it is traveling. To observe the electron on the one hand, and to chart its movement on the other, is to confront two mutually exclusive choices. 

     Likewise in America we are incapable of simultaneously articulating goals - or a strategic aim - and acting in accordance with those goals, or at the very least how reality treats our goals. U.S. support for representational government the world over is, in theory, universally accepted. But when one analyzes our recognition (or lack-there-of) of Middle Eastern political parties/movements, one is unable to confirm our republican credentials. It wrinkles our brain to entertain the idea that a strategy can - indeed, should - be pursued in the face of chaos and uncertainty. A state can not articulate a grand strategy and control reality at the same time. Our domestic affairs are no different. "Affordable credit for young, middle-income homebuyers as a goal? Awesome!" "We've found a new way to effectively package a bundle of different mortgages into a single portfolio for optimal cash flow? That's fucking amazing! And it's legal? Sweet Baby Jesus!" BAM! Worst recession since the Great Depression. "What's that? The justice system is popularly thought to be unfair, rigged, and downright broken? Damn, that sucks. We should have the nation's first ever black President promise to make government more transparent, help the middle/lower-income families, hold banks and large corporations responsible for irresponsible actions, punish 'white-collar' crime more vigorously. Yeah, that will breath trust, confidence, and life back into our democratic foundations!" BAM! God damn National Security Agency (NSA) hacked the entire nation and Guantonomo is STILL open!

Random Thoughts Upon Desperate Times (Part 1)

Lycurgus

     

     The Athenian republic did not fall after the Great Peloponnesian War (431 - 404 BC). Far from it. Athenian republicanism survived for another hundred years. I repeat: the Athenian republic did not fall until 322 BC. Philip II of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, destroyed Athenian republicanism. For an honest, contemporary treatment of that final death-struggle, one need only read Demosthenes' "Phillipics". That group of orations laments - inter alia - local corruption at the highest level of government, citizen apathy, and the perils of hiring a mercenary army to fight one's own battles. 

     "The only thing that stays the same is the antagonistic behavior of states." That claim seeks to sweep over the particulars of international relations like a matador's muleta hides the horns of a Spanish bull. Come now, let us try a bit harder. Are states deliberately antagonistic? No. The complex system of international relations - state to state relations - pushes states this way and that, arrests state progress with no warning, propels state movement when time and momentum are thought to have frozen, and this uncertainty - this CHAOS - is often identified by observers to be the necessary and sufficient cause of a state's health. We are mistaken to think that it is the system that controls states. States are phantoms if their social institutions disappear. 

     The Roman republic was laid low from within, during the upswing of that state's growth. Beginning in earnest with Marius and Sulla, thrown into overdrive by Gaius Julius Caesar, and finished by Octavian (soon to be Augustus Caesar) after his civil struggle with Mac Antony, the legal and constitutional institutions of republican Rome were destroyed by the elite class. Marius reformed the structure of the army and rewarded his troops with massive booty. While this threshold was crossed by Scipio (Africanus) after his defeat of Hannibal (202 BC), profit and treasure were not the envy of legionarres until Marius and Sulla served as Consuls. Julius Caesar and his triumvirate colleague (one of them) Gnaeus Pompey institutionalized this profiteering norm as the Levant and Mediterranean coastline were taken hold of, first, by Pompey, followed shortly thereafter by Caesar's conquest of Gaul. After the latter of these two men achieved his Pyrrhic victory of that civil war, he was soon assassinated by Brutus, Cassius, and Co: the Senatorial republicans who saw tyranny for what it was (Fun fact: before his assasination, Caesar changed his will to bequeath roughly 3/4's of his wealth and estate, along with his name, to his nephew Octavian, but should the latter not accept that dangerous inheritance then guess who was next in line for Caesar's willful favor? BRUTUS!!!). Octavian and Marc Antony - Julius Caesar's 1st Lieutenant - quickly locked horns with one another, burdening the Roman body politic with the second bloody civil war in a single generation. Triumphant, Caesar Augustus dismantled the Roman republic (27 BC) after rewriting the constitution. The SYSTEM within which Rome acted had no effect upon the dramatic shift from republic to empire. 

     There is a period of grandeur which follows the establishment of any repubic in history, and yes, history does repeat itself. Classical Athens and republican Rome burst outwards upon and into the system of international relations because the rule of law and the strength of the citizen body-politic complemented one another. This symbiotic relationship was - and is - the sine qua non of the foundation of republican institutions. With time, however, - and to varying degrees - the general body-politic becomes either apathetic or indifferent towards civic participation. In and of themselves, apathy and indifference are not capable of taking the legs out from below a republic; a more active, pernicious effort is required by the elite class to sully accepted norms. At this point in the life of a republic, the rule of law is still in force and governs the actions and behaviors of a majority of citizens. However, a minority of actors - the elite plutocrats - takes it upon itself to slyly work at the fringe of legal boundaries to seize opportunities. Whether these opportunities manifest themselves as monetary gains, political power, etc., is no matter. It is the sense of unfairness that the everyday Joe and Jane perceive that matters. They see the rich and powerful as capable, willing, and eager gluttons. The rich and powerful elite are seen to 'rollover' their success at little to no cost to themselves on the one hand, while disenfranchising the low to middle class workers on the other. When confidence within, and trust of, republican institutions disappears, then those very institutions vanish like the ephemeral dreams they are. 

     The American republic is teetering upon a precipice because. While the rule of law was used to build the state's democratic institutions, the elite are working to gain more power while acting contrary to what Montesquie termed "The Spirit of the Laws". Campaign finance is a web of re-allocated, mysterious channels; the Electoral College and 'gerrymandering' are relied upon by institutional actors to stratify and strategize legislative/executive power; an objective media presence does not exist; wealth and value have pooled along the corners of the national economy as a result of finance; the nation's top political leaders are incapable - indeed, CANNOT - tell the truth and we know this; the "ability to govern" is a distant consideration of legislators who are above all else intent upon re-election campaigns; the national and state legal codes would befuddle a Byzantine government official; and, most depressing of all, ordinary citizens are told what is legal, how law is to be interpreted, and how the nation's code of ethics should be updated as a result instead of the process of legal interpretation growing organically from the body-politic. 

Solon

     To recap: (1) the Athenian republic did not fall after the Great Peloponnesian War: Philip II ended that dream nearly one-hundred years later. (2) The Roman republic was dismantled from within by the elite class. Period. (3) The system within which states act is chaotic, yes, but states can rise or fall from their own inertia just as easy as sudden, outside shocks. (4) The rule of law is the seed from which republicanism grows, but as that plant grows to maturity it must be cared for and attended to lest some of the "healthy" branches use their pride of place to capture a disproportional amount of sunlight and in so doing gorge themselves while choking the life out of the entire plant's body. (5) History not only repeats itself when we look at the rise and fall of republics, but it is a narrative from which we see the rule of law borne, grow, and then manipulated as a five-dollar-hooker. As she is jaded, so does a republic violate and contradict the very institutions upon which it derives its life.

The Historical Phenomenon of Decisive Battles Part I: Themistocles and the Battle of Salamis

Students of history will agree that the study of ancient warfare is arguably the most intriguing era for consideration. Whether one looks at the citizen armies of the Greek city-states like Athens and Sparta; the conscripted masses of the Persian empire; or a blend of the two, characteristic of both Republican and Imperial Rome, one can not help but marvel at the sheer magnitude and force of these armies and the resources they demanded. The historians of old -- Herodotus, Thucydides, Livy, Polybius, and Tactitus, to name a few -- wrote entire chapters on the efforts required to raise, equip, train, and supply these juggernauts. A full Roman legion from the Imperial era numbered roughly 5,500 men at arms, for instance, with a mix of infantry and cavalry, the former making up the lion's share of combatants. A full Consular Roman army was massive: numbering roughly 20,000 men.

These bodies of troop were incredibly expensive, cumbersome, and required a massive supply of food and equipment for the entirety of their campaigns which often lasted years. Hannibal's invasion of the Italian peninsula in 218 B.C. lasted fifteen years. To command an army of either ancient Greece, Rome, or Persia was the highest honor for an individual. To succeed in battle was to guarantee one's place in the annals of heroes and legends to be cherished for generations. To lose, on the other hand, could mean death in the worst case scenario, or a lifetime of shame for the losing general and his progeny at best. Confronted with these two extremes, it is no wonder that planned, pitched battles between two fully deployed armies were rare. It is against this tendency that we must consider the choices of generals to gamble everything upon major, decisive battles aimed at the complete annihilation of their enemy's forces.

Bust of Themistocles

We begin with the decisive battle at Salamis between the Greek city-state alliance, led by Athens and Sparta, more or less commanded by the half-Athenian statesman, Themistocles, and the Persian empire, commanded by Xerxes. 

The Persian emperor Darius crushed the Ionian Revolt in 493 B.C., and then swore an oath to punish the Athenians who had supported the revolt. Herodotus tells us that one of Darius' slaves had the peculiar task of  whispering into the emperor's ear, "Sire, remember the Athenians," every single night at dinner. The Lord of Persia is said to have fumed each and every time he heard these words. The hatred Darius felt for the intransigent Athenians was to shake the foundations of the Greek and Aegean civilizations for generations to come.

One man in particular, Themistocles, himself only half Athenian, was to shepherd his fellow citizens during their darkest hours and achieve one of the greatest military victories in history. His brilliant long-term strategy secured for Athens a fighting chance when their hour of doom was upon them, but it was his insistence for, and command of, the Battle of Salamis in 480 B.C. that would be the pinnacle of his remarkable career.

First, we must travel back to 490 B.C. Darius invaded Greece with roughly 35,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and a fleet of transport and supply ships. The Persian army landed at the Bay of Marathon where the 10,000 Athenians and 1,000 Plataens, under the generalship of the Athenian, Miltiades, were waiting for them. The battle that ensued began as a clear mismatch in favor of the more numerous Persian army, but ended with a stunning Greek victory thanks the the decisive battle plan that Miltiades was able to perform.

With the Persians defeated and gone, the Greeks reveled in their victory, knowing full well that they had snatched their freedom from the jaws of a tyrannical host. In Athens, most of the citizens considered the Persian menace to no longer pose a threat. One man, Themistocles, knew instinctively however that the Persians would be back in the near future seeking retribution. Any emperor would seek revenge for the loss suffered at Marathon for both practical and symbolic reasons. For Darius, revenge would not prove attainable, as he died before he could invade again. The imperial mantle fell to his son, Xerxes, instead.

Prior to the Persian invasion of Greece in 481/0 B.C., the Athenians struck an unusually large vein of silver at their colonial mining city of Laurium in 483 B.C. This instance of good fortune provided Themistocles with a rare opportunity to apply his skill as a statesman. Like a joint-stock venture, the Athenian assembly was on the verge of voting to share the new silver wealth proportionally between all of the city-state's citizens. Themistocles, on the other hand, knew that however honorable such a plan might be, it would be a missed opportunity for Athens to protect herself from the future Persian menace. To seize such an opportunity, and to protect his city, Themistocles wanted to build a massive Athenian navy of combat triremes. Keep in mind, again, that most Athenians did not think another Persian invasion of mainland Greece to be an imminent threat, so Themistocles needed to find a more persuasive image to support his argument. The answer? Aegina. This island city-state was located south-west of the Athenian port of Piraeus and the two cities were perpetual enemies. In fact, at the time of this debate concerning the silver wealth, Athens and Aegina were locked in a simmering feud. So Themistocles linked together his goal of building a massive navy with the threat of Aegina's likely harassment of Athenian trade and blockade of merchant shipping lanes.

The Athenian Assembly agreed and within two years' time, Themistocles' navy of roughly 200 triremes was built. The timing of his achievement could not have been better. As of spring 480 B.C. Xerxes has amassed a land invasion force of roughly 250,000-300,000 men and 1,200 ships, the bulk of which were offensive, naval warfare ships. This entire invasion force -- the largest in history until the allied invasion of Nazi occupied Normandy on 6 June 1944 -- was bent on the destruction of Greek civilization, and subjugation of its people. 

Xerxes crossed the Hellespont, swept down through Thessaly, defeated and conquered the ancient, religious city-state of Thebes, and brought the defeated remnants of that proud city over to the Persian cause. After Thessaly and the Theban defeat, Xerxes won two major battles, one on land and one at sea, at the simultaneous battles of Thermopylae and Artemesium. With no military answer to this invasion force capable of meeting Xerxes in battle, the Greek world north of the Peloponnese no longer existed. Themistocles had convinced the Athenians to desert their city at this time or face the wrath of the Persians. Xerxes marched into Attica (the countryside of Athens), devastated the crops and farmland, and finally marched through the gates of the now uninhabited city-state of Athens. The Persians killed anyone who remained and burnt the Acropolis to the ground. 

Persian land and naval invasion routes 481-0 B.C.

Preceding this event, Themistocles had convinced his countrymen to evacuate the city, noting to the distraught Athenians that a city can -- and in this case, must -- live on in the people, not the physical walls or buildings that they once called Athens. Some people said, "Why don't we march out and meet the Persians on the battlefield? We won a decade ago at Marathon." Themistocles answered that they would be facing a quarter of a million Persians, not the 35,000 from a decade ago, and the Greeks would be wiped out. "Why don't we barricade ourselves within the city walls of Athens?" some asked. Themistocles answered that they would be cut off from re-supply from the sea and land as a land force of 250,000 men and 1,200 triremes could easily encircle Athens and her port of Piraeus. The other Greek leaders wanted to build a defensive wall across the Corinthian isthmus and fortify the Peloponnese with what remaining land and naval forces they had. Themistocles warned them that the Persians would simply sail around the Peloponnese and push through the Saronic gulf, thus bypassing the defensive wall and overwhelming any naval presence the Greeks could muster. Most importantly, Themistocles stressed that the last plan was impractical because there were no ports sufficiently protected enough to allow for such a passive strategy to succeed. Themistocles reasoned that only a purely offensive, naval battle would free the Greeks from their present danger. And this is how Themistocles convinced the Hellenes to fight a decisive battle at the island of Salamis, within the narrow straits between the rocky shores. 










(Left) Battle dispositions and maneuvers of Greeks and Persians at Salamis; (Above) Satellite image of Salamis and narrow straits where battle was fought. 



After convincing the Greeks to fight this battle, Themistocles used a bit of disinformation to likewise bring Xerxes to battle as well. He sent a messenger up to the great Persian king, the messenger obviously posing as a traitor seeking safety and reward. Keep in mind that Xerxes had won at Thermopylae in large part due to the traitorous Greek counsel of Ephialtes who had shown a secret goat path to the Persians which wound behind the Spartan and Greek force blocking the pass. It is no wonder that Xerxes, when presented with another tip for defeating the Greeks, this time absolutely, he jumped at the opportunity without question. The double-agent of Themistocles told Xerxes that the time to strike the Greek navy was at hand and that the Persian king must act decisively before the Greeks sail away to Sicily or some other colonial outpost. 

Facing a Persian fleet of roughly 1,100-1,200 triremes, Themistocles arrayed the combined Greek naval forces in a short, compact line of triremes perpendicular to the incoming Persian fleet. Xerxes pushed his main body of ships into the strait while swinging a smaller detachment of Egyptian ships around the island to block any retreat by the Greeks. The Corinthian section of the Greek navy was to hold off this back-door menace while the main body, commanded by Themistocles, was to spring its trap upon the cumbersome and numerous Persian body. The Greek ships were larger and more unwieldy than the fast Persian ships, but it was the large brass rams on the front of the Greek ships that gave Themistocles a definitive advantage in the narrow straits. As soon as Xerxes fleet entered the narrow body of water, they were struck from the flank by the Greek triremes. Unable to maneuver, the Persian fleet was decimated. As the front line of Persian ships was caught off guard, they tried to back water and retreat but instead fouled their oars with those ships of the second and third lines. To make matters worse, a wedge of Greek ships split the entire Persian fleet in two as it cleaved its way through the now immobile Persian force. 

Numbers are sketchy, but most historians agree that around 250-300 Persian ships sank that day and no less than 70,000-80,000 Persian sailors and marines lost their lives. This was to be the worst naval defeat in European and Mediterranean affairs, even more devastating than the Ottoman defeat at the battle of Lepanto in 1571.  

The defeat at Salamis crippled Xerxes' invasion force. No longer able to guarantee his supply train for his army, Xerxes took the main portion of the invasion force and returned to Persia with the remainder of his fleet. He left a large force of infantry behind under the command of Mardonius to fight the Greeks, and the following summer in 479 B.C., such a battle took place on the plains of Platea. A large force of Greek city-states marched together out of the Peloponnese and met the Persian army which had been cut off from its lines of supply and communication, and had grown tired of conquest. The Greek hoplites won a decisive victory and, for all intents and purposes, the Persian menace would not threaten the Greek world for another sixty years. Even then, the Persians were invited by the Spartans and the Peloponnesian League to help defeat the Athenian empire at the tail end of the devastating Great Peloponnesian War. 

For our consideration, we must look to Themistocles as a statesman of singular vision and decisiveness. His ability to convince his countrymen to evacuate their city in exchange for the open seas and an uncertain future, and his successful persuasion of the Hellenic alliance to fight one decisive battle at Salamis, against all odds, were two of history's more remarkable diplomatic achievements. His cool-headed plan of attack within the narrow straits at Salamis, and his subsequent command of the ensuing battle, were a testament to his superb generalship. More than any other consideration, his confident choice to fight a decisive battle at Salamis is most impressive. There is no doubt that to lose at Salamis would have meant certain death and subjugation for the entire Greek civilization from that day forth. Judging a decisive battle to be a reasonable alternative to flight is the most remarkable achievement Themistocles has on his record of stunning accolades. And that is why he serves as our first of three installments of history's most noteworthy victories at decisive battles.

Next time, we look at the three successive victories of the Carthaginian General, Hannibal Barca:the River Ticinus, Lake Trasimene, and the glorious battle of Cannae. These victories took place during the early years of Hannibal's fifteen-year invasion of the Roman republic. 

How the Dallas Cowboys and Greenbay Packers Explain the Middle East Peace Process

     Cairo, Alexandria, Baghdad, Damascus, Aleppo, Mosul, Beirut. Among others, these are the major cities of the Middle East. Before colonialism took root in this region, many citizens of a myriad of different ethnicities and confessions professed allegiance to the cities they lived in and the surrounding neighborhoods. Can we not wipe the map of today's Middle East clean, leaving only the cities as focal points for a new state system?

Would you not agree that Dallas Cowboy fans and "cheese-headed" Packers fans at times are more loyal to their cities than the state or country they live in? You wouldn't be wrong to ask: Why should it even matter? or, Are being a Packer fan and owing allegiance to the U.S. mutually exclusive options? That's because you have little reason to reject the pride that accompanies living as a citizen of the United States. But what does it mean to be Lebanese or Iraqi? For many inhabitants of these countries today, the answers to the questions I have just asked can be puzzling and ambiguous, if not downright inappropriate.

     Before World War I, it really meant little to be Iraqi or Lebanese in the sense that these national definitions were equated with territorial limits that were irrespective of the populations within them. Instead, most of the people that lived around major urban centers derived their pride and loyalty, to a significant degree, from the bazaars and main streets that ran through the major cities. Sunnis, Shi'a, Maronites, Arabs, Kurds, and company, were not constrained by arbitrary lines on a map or fictitious governments that were created by Great Britain and France. These newly formed governments wrangled together urban dwellers and hinterland nomads into defined but awkward units.

After World War II, colonialism retreated and the United Nations celebrated as new kingdoms and republics sprang up throughout the region. And since that time, tensions between confessions and sectarian struggles have continued unabated. It is no wonder why there is so much violence in the Middle East today. What would happen if one day fans of the Dallas Cowboys and Green Bay Packers were moved to Chicago and the citizens of all three of those cities were called upon to root for a newly created team? It would be pandemonium! None of these people would agree to the terms and violent infighting would surely ensue. The relationships between and among the different religious sects and confessions of the colonial Middle East were changed in the like manner. Although, in order not to compare religion and ethnicity with professional football teams, I have to say the tensions that arose between colonial subjects were a matter of life and death. The change was dramatic, the damage was irrevocable, and the long path leading to today's civil wars was laid with blind precision.

     A city mayor or governor of the pre-colonial Middle East exercised remarkably different responsibilities as governing entities than state/nationwide legislators do today. The former entity was charged with preserving the peace and the facilitation of trade between merchants and consumers who often valued commerce over confessional loyalty. On the streets of Constantinople during the Byzantine Era, coinage was accepted as faithful currency, not religion. A Shi'a's hand did no evil to silver or gold such that a Sunni would refuse it as payment.

     If we worry today about the best ways to strengthen fragile states in the Middle East, or prop up loyal dictators in that region, we do so only because we lack the mental capacity to remember a time when cities were the lowest common denominator of governing entities. To wit, Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and Corinth were only a few city-states amidst thousands throughout classical Greece. City-states were the loci around which a menagerie of different ethnicities gathered to trade goods and blend cultures. These city-states of old commanded unquestionable loyalty and the benefits that one would accrue from being an Athenian or Spartan was far more tangible than the treatment some Lebanese or Iraqi citizens are subject today.

     Can we not wipe the map of today's Middle East clean, leaving only the cities as focal points for building a new state-system? Can we not think of an institution of government that is representative, but founded upon a city's population? It would seem to me that a city is a more tangible entity to owe allegiance to than a country with more or less meaningless boundaries.

     Cities command not only more loyalty than some of today's countries but, in some cases, also have more output. Take a look at this Wall Street Journal article by Conor Dougherty from July, 2012 and the accompanying chart. I'll delve into that insight more fully later, but does it not pique your interest to know that cities, and the commerce that is made possible through their networks, provide the most tangible benefit for citizens of different faiths? Those benefits are jobs, income, and the ability to feed your family. The classical Greek city-states of old crumbled under the weight of Alexander the Great's Macedon and then the Roman Republic. If we were to affect the change I speak of only to witness Middle Eastern city-states falling prey to the same conventional aggression typical of the ancient world then we face a set of problems that need to be discussed in some other forum.

     It's not that the "state system" is broken. In fact, however imperfect the global state system is, it still is better than all alternatives. And keep in mind: "state" is just a word that can easily be extended by, and replaced with, "city-state." The lines were simply drawn in the wrong place because the colonial powers started in the wrong place. Great Britain and France just carved up areas that were more or less equal in size and wealth.