Gaugamela: Alexander's Shattering Thrust at the Persian Heart

Alexander the Great of Macedon enjoyed the most successful military career of any general from antiquity. Following the assassination of his father, Philip II, in 336 B.C., Alexander was proclaimed king of Macedon by his nobles. He inherited command of the professional Macedonian army at the age of 20, an army born from the genius of Philip and tempered by warfare against the Greek city-states. Already an experienced battlefield commander at the time of his ascension to the throne, Alexander leveraged his own strategic and tactical brilliance with the established potency of his father's army. The result was an unstoppable juggernaut, led by Alexander through the greater Greek land area and then eastward into the Persian empire.

One battle in particular, the Battle of Gaugamela (331 B.C.), deserves to be singled out as a case-study of decisiveness in warfare, a truly decisive battle. First, however, a brief description of the Macedonian army needs to be articulated in order to set the stage for Gaugamela's narration.

Philip constructed a brand new type of army, something never seen or tried before in ancient Greece. His primary striking force, the phalanx, was a dramatic evolution of the classic phalanx relied upon by the Greek city-states, most notably Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and Corinth. These states packed their infantrymen together into solid, symmetrical blocks of fighting men. These blocks, or phalanxes, operated as a single unit. Each man carried a spear roughly seven to eight feet in length in one hand and a large, round shield in the other. Their shields protected not only themselves from neck to knee, but also the man to the immediate left of the shield bearer. The battlefield effectiveness of the phalanx relied almost entirely upon its weight, momentum, and cohesion. The phalanx maneuvered forward exclusively, required level ground, and was dangerously exposed to flanking attacks. The force needed to carry the phalanx forward was drawn from the rear ranks as these men supported and urged their countrymen forward. It was this one-dimensional tactical unit that Philip manipulated in order to fashion something far more complex and deadly than its predecessor: the piked heavy-infantry phalanx.

Philip equipped his heavy infantrymen with the sarissa, a spear nearly double the length of those used by the Greek city-states. Macedonian infantrymen were obliged to use both hands in order to hold and wield this larger spear but the added distance of reach Macedonian pikemen enjoyed more than compensated for the more cumbersome burden. Lacking a free hand with which to hold a shield, these pikemen used smaller shields which were strapped to their left arms in order to deflect, inter alia, arrows and javelins.  The first few ranks of the Macedonian phalanx held the points of their sarissas forward directing their spear thrusts into the front ranks of the enemy phalanx. In addition, these longer spears enabled more men from the formation to make contact with the enemy. In effect, up to eighty (80) spear tips would confront the front ranks of an enemy phalanx. This advantage of proximate contact saturated the surface area where the two opposing forces met and while the front ranks fought the middle ranks held their sarissas at an angle to deflect arrows and javelins while the rear ranks held their spears straight upwards.

Coupled with the heavy infantry phalanx, the pikemen, Philip employed additional tactical units to complement the wall of spears. He used stone-throwers called peltasts to disrupt and harass his enemies in order to fracture their lines thereby exposing gaps and holes into and through which the pikemen or cavalry could maneuver. And it was the Macedonian cavalry, the Companion Cavalry, which were the envy of the known world of the 4th century B.C.

Together with allied auxiliaries, these three primary arms of the Macedonian battle order provided Philip with far more flexibility than his Greek counterparts. Simply put: Philip crashed his pikemen phalanx into the front lines of the enemy's phalanx thereby pinning them and halting their forward momentum. His phalanx made deadly contact with the enemy before their shorter spears could be used and in greater numbers.  As this initial contest was unfolding, Philip harassed the enemy flanks with his peltasts and readied the cavalry wings of his army for their eventual, decisive attack.

As holes and gaps emerged within the enemy phalanx -- and they invariably did -- Philip thrust his Companion Cavalry into these holes and gaps forcing the entire formation to split and in-so-doing depriving the classic phalanx of its battlefield modus operandi. This 'hammer and anvil' maneuver worked so well that, following the Battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.), Philip rendered the phalanx of the Greek city-states obsolete. Never again were land battles fought by one-dimensional armies. Instead, the Macedonian evolution forged a new future where separate and distinct units of the same army complemented one another through the performance of singular, tactical acts as part of a more holistic strategy. This weapon was bequeathed to Alexander at the age of 20 after his father was assassinated in 336 B.C.

And yet he did not shrink from the challenge because he had fought in his father's army since he was 16 and eventually led the Companion Cavalry. It was to his credit that Philip's victory at Chaeronea proved so decisive. As the Macedonian line pivoted around its center, Alexander led his Companion Cavalry wing in an arching, wheel-type motion and smashed into the enemy lines -- in this case an alliance of Greek city-states led by Athens and Thebes -- sowing panic and confusion within the fragmented phalanx formation. To disrupt and/or dismantle the solid, closely guarded nature of the phalanx was tantamount to a death sentence. This was so because the individual infantryman -- the hoplite -- drew his fighting strength from his proximity and connection to the other hoplites within the phalanx. The integrity of a phalanx's form was an existential necessity and it was this necessary condition that Philip's multi-faceted army proved so capable of depriving the Greeks of. Standing alone, single hoplites were poorly equipped for battle and easy pray for the type of massive, shock attack Alexander's cavalry was known for.

After the two heavy-infantry units of both armies engaged one another Alexander routinely arrayed his cavalry into a wedge formation. This tactical organization during an attack facilitated the aggravation and exploitation of gaps within the enemy lines. And this specialized formation enjoyed the added benefit of Alexander's leadership and charisma.

Alexander led this shock unit into battle as the first soldier among a group of equals. Raised in the saddle, Macedonian cavalrymen were consummate riders and deadly soldiers. They used the rugged, mountainous terrain of the Macedonian landscape as a learning ground and implemented their skillful precision during battle first for Philip and then under Alexander beginning in 335 B.C.

Upon his ascension, numerous Greek city-states to the south of the Macedonian kingdom rebelled against Alexander hoping to rid themselves of Macedonian overlordship. In response Alexander first invaded Thrace and then marched on the rebellious Greek city-states. This consolidation of power began in 335 B.C. and ended only after Alexander crushed Theban resistance, sacking Thebes and razing the city to the ground. Upon the conclusion of this early success, Alexander embarked upon what we now know to be his lengthy and miraculous invasion of Persia and the far east.

Route of Alexander's conquests. 

After crushing Greek resistance Alexander next invaded the vast Persian empire, an act his father would have likely undertaken had he not been assassinated. In quick succession, Alexander won brilliant victories at the Battle of Grannicus (334 B.C.) and then again at the Battle of Issus (333 B.C.). In addition Alexander laid siege to and eventually sacked a number of cities which were ruled by Persian satraps: Halicarnassus (334 B.C.), Tyre (332 B.C.), and Gaza. These accomplishments set the stage for Alexander's most impressive battlefield performance: the Battle of Gaugamela (331 B.C.).

The Persian King, Darius III, exercised personal control over his armies after the Battle of the Grannicus river. He organized a meticulous plan for the battle on the flat plains of Gaugamela leaving nothing to chance, his two-to-one troop advantage notwithstanding. In fact, the Persians numbered roughly 87,000 to 90,000 troops divided into the following units: Peltasts - 30,000; Cavalry - 40,000; Persian Immortals - 10,000; Bactrian Cavalry - 2,000; Archers - 1,500; Scythed Chariots - 200; War Elephants - 15. Particularly menacing were the Scythed chariots which brandished sharp blades from their wheel-spokes and which specialized in decimating infantry formations. Darius went so far as to level the ground upon which his chariots would charge, effectively creating 'lanes' for an attack.

The Persian line extended miles in each direction and no matter how thin Alexander made his line he could not stretch it far enough to protect his flanks from a Persian envelopment. And so he did what all great commanders do when faced with an insurmountable problem: he approached the problem from another direction and created for himself a tailor-made answer to this conundrum. Instead of deploying his battle-line in a parallel, squared-up orientation vis a v. the Persian line -- an act which would surely guarantee a Persian victory -- Alexander had his army deployed in echelon, or a slanted, oblique formation with his left flank refused. Sounds technical, yes, but this organization can be easily explained.

The Persians outnumbered Alexander's Macedonians by a factor of two (2), that is two Persians for every Macedonian. If Alexander reacted passively by accepting battle on the terms set forth by Darius then his army, the Macedonians, would surely  suffer defeat. And so Alexander took the initiative and built a strategy that exercised his army's strength -- the Companion Cavalry -- in relation to the Persian masses.

He tucked his left wing down and in facing the Persian line at an angle in preparation for Darius' flanking maneuver. This is referred to as refusing one's flank, the weaker flank of one's army. To refuse one's weak flank is to protect it from the enemy's numerical superiority while striking with the other flank. Alexander instructed his trusted lieutenant, Parmenio, to 'wheel back and to the left,' constantly turning to face the Persian attack. So long as this wing of the Macedonian army survived Alexander could administer a sharp cavalry charge into the heart of the Persian army. While Parmenio commanded the refused left flank during the battle, Alexander sent his piked-phalanx forward at an angle to make contact with and pin down the Persian center. These two maneuvers -- refusing his left flank on the one hand and using his phalanx as a holding force on the other -- enabled Alexander to effectively neutralize the Persian advantage of numerical superiority. Alexander's final stratagem was offensive, and decisively so. After all, the justification for arranging one's army in echelon, or in an oblique order, is to stall and hold the enemy's line at one point in order to concentrate one's striking arm at another, local point using a superior force. So how did Alexander do it?

Tune in tomorrow, or today rather, for the dramatic climax to the Battle of Gaugamela...

Decisive Battles Part II: Hannibal's Orchestra at Cannae

Reputed marble bust of Hannibal

Most every military commander from the past had to confront the difficulty of implementing his/her plan of battle as the hour of combat came nigh. For, a host of different obstacles, both predictable and unpredictable, were bound to disrupt the best laid plans. Weather variety, troop morale, enemy dispositions, terrain, the time of day, etc., are all inclusive components of a battle's whole. Woe to the commander who neglected these factors or downplayed either their uncertain nature on the one hand, or how any one unforeseen change more generally can sow confusion, panic, and chaos on the battlefield, on the other.

The greatest generals from history, rather, have conquered the need to adapt to uncertainty in battle. At the apex of skill they strike in force and at the desired time when Chaos extends her hand to offer the willing general a chance to grab a decisive victory. Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz was brilliant for his management of uncertainty. His abandonement of the battlefield's central focus, the Pratzen Heights, in order to tempt his enemy, the Tsar Nicolas, to overextend himself worked because Napoleon expected the Tsar's eagerness for glory. By moving up the hill, Nicolas exposed the center of the Russian battle-line to attack and, yes, this sequence of events was planned by Napoleon. But while French victory was more or less secured after Napoleon struck back at the Heights, it was Napoleon's genius coupled with the professionalism and adaptability of his army that won the battle thereafter, not his battle plan alone. Likewise, Alexander fashioned a battle plan at Guagemela which was tailor-made for his army's strengths and which was an answer to Darius' overwhelming advantage in number of troops. But how far Alexander and his Companion Cavalry rode out past the Macedonian right flank, or what was the most opportune moment to about-face his shock cavalry unit to pierce the Persian line -- both of these considerations could never be known while Alexander crafted his strategy.

In other words any strategic plan, if it is to succeed, must survive the shock and friction of the actual battle. That was an idea most clearly articulated by von Clausewitz: theoretical plans are always more difficult to implement in the real word because of friction, or the gradual loss of both energy and momentum of an army while it acts. Napoleon and Alexander both achieved masterful victories at Austerlitz and Guagemela, respectively, not only because they had the tactical skill to overcome battlefield friction, but also because their original plans were sound. They considered chance as an operating force upon the outcome of their battles and deployed their forces in such a way as to invite chaos and the opportunities that present themselves.

Which brings us to Hannibal's overwhelming victory at the Battle of Cannae in 216BC. Arguably the most impressive victory in history, Hannibal's pre-battle strategy and the actual implementation of that strategy at the tactical level were nearly identical. For all intents and purposes, Hannibal achieved perfection. Here's how he did it.

Quickly, Hannibal Barca, the son of Hamilcar Barca, the leading but tragic general during the First Punic War (264-241BC), was born in what is today Tunisia on the North African coast. He was raised, however, in southern Iberia, today's Spain, and he was raised with one goal in mind: to destroy the Romans. He grew up fast living amongst soldiers loyal to his father; crack Libyan infantrymen, Numidian horsemen, and Spanish mercenaries. He inherited this professional Carthaginian army after his father died in battle and after his brother-in-law, Hasdrubal, was assassinated by Spanish chieftains. Worshipped as a demi-god by the army, Hannibal's early command of his army made quick and ruthless work of the guilty Spanish nobles, and he either recruited their followers or simply sent them home.

His legacy began as he and his army initiated the Second Punic War with Rome (218-201BC) after sacking a local city, Seguntum, which was allied with Rome. Knowing full well that the Roman navy controlled the Mediterranean, and eager for glory and revenge, Hannibal secured the most effective defensive posture against Rome's eventual retaliatory invasion of either Spain or Carthage: he went on the offensive and marched his gigantic army through Spain, across the Pyrenees and into Gaul before vanishing into the Alps during winter! After losing roughly half of his army from the cold and desertion, Hannibal and his men emerged from the Alpine passes and marched into the Po Valley on Italian soil. Thankfully, the Romans were completely surprised upon his arrival and this allowed Hannibal enough time to rest his army and to recruit local Gaul mercenaries who belonged to tribes who had long chaffed under the repressive Roman yoke.

Hannibal's Invasion Route 

In quick succession he handily defeated two Roman armies, first at the River Trebia (December 218BC) and then at Lake Trasimene (June 217BC). Both were brilliant for their strategic scope and tactical maneuvering, but Hannibal would outdo himself in August of 216BC near the Roman city, Cannae. It served as a link in the supply chain which sustained the legions as a strategic depot for food and equipment. Rome could not countenance an invading army positioned in southern Italy so close to Sicily which was Rome's breadbasket at the time. Hannibal knew his march on Cannae would invite a determined military response and this is precisely the decisive opportunity Hannibal longed for.

Hannibal sought a decisive battle at Cannae because he was confident of the conclusions he had reached while using the same logic he employed when he first decided to invade mainland Italy. The only guaranteed way to bring Rome to its knees, or so Hannibal believed, was to draw out her armies and to defeat them in pitched battles in order to sap the city of its true power. After Rome had suffered a number of crushing defeats, Hannibal reasoned, her local allies -- who were nominal allies at most -- would abandon her to join Carthage's struggle in the hopes of regaining their freedom from Roman overlordship.

The battle took place in Apulia in southeast Italy during August when the air is dry and the ground dusty. The two Roman Consuls for the year, or elected military executives, were Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Tarentius Varro. The latter was a fire-breathing war-hawk who, like Hannibal, sought nothing else but a decisive, pitched battle but lacked the strategic acumen which Hannibal had developed over the years. Varro and Paullus marched their respective legionary armies to Cannae and camped on either side of the Aufidius river. Roman custom held that if two Consuls occupied the same battlefield then they had two choices of that battle's command: (1) each would command his respective army as they combined forces as one overwhelming unit; or (2) each Consul would command all of the troops on alternating days. They chose the second option, and on the day of battle it was Varro's turn to lead the troops. No one, except for Hannibal of course, knew that it was towards a hellish and gruesome fate that the Roman's would be led to while following Varro's leadership.

In approximate terms, the Carthaginian army numbered around 50,000 men sub-divided into 32,000 heavy infantry, 8,000 light infantry, and 10,000 cavalry. The Romans overwhelmingly outnumbered Hannibal's forces: roughly 86,000 men filled their ranks sub-divided into 40,000 Roman infantry, 40,000 allied infantry, and roughly 6,000 cavalry. This superiority would serve as the deciding factor for Varro's strategic decision making process. He decided to mass his legionnaires closer together than usual at both the individual level and the manipular level (a maniple numbered 120 men for the first two groups, 60 for the third, and 60 maniples made a Legion) in order to punch through the center of Hannibal's line thereby dividing a weaker force in the face of numerical superiority. Hannibal was aware of Varro's aggressive tactics, expected a heavy thrust towards the center of his line, but, ironically, was hoping for this very outcome.

Hannibal arrayed his battle-line in a crescent shape, or a bow-like shape with the center of his line closest to the Romans while his right and left flanks were in echelon backwards.

Notice the Carthaginian battle-line, in blue, angled backwards to invite the Roman attack.

Hannibal used the sheer weight of numbers the Romans threw at his army and the momentum which carried their attack. His one caveat was the ability of his Spanish and Gaulish mercenaries positioned at the center of his line -- the very spot where the primary Roman thrust would be delivered -- to sustain the onslaught, give ground, but never break. Hannibal's plan necessitated that his center steadily retreat backwards in order to expose the flanks of the heavy wedge-formation which the Romans employed. That is asking a lot of an army. And yet this insistence upon bending but not breaking ensured a Carthaginian victory.

As the tightly packed Roman infantry line pushed ever forward into Hannibal's line, the crescent shape of the Carthaginian army began to reorient itself to face inwards instead of outwards. In other words, while Hannibal's right and left infantry flanks stood still, and while his center steadily fell backwards, the Romans carved out for themselves a pocket into which they ceaselessly marched. Eventually the bow-like shape faced inwards and the Romans were suddenly surrounded on three sides. While the Roman Legion was more flexible than most armies of its day, no army could withstand three prolonged, simultaneous attacks upon its front line, and its right and left flanks.

Before the developing infantry scenario is played out, however, we must turn to the cavalries of both armies, positioned on either flank of the battlefield, so that we can more easily understand the bloody climax to the battle.

Phase II at Cannae. Hannibal's crescent, bow-like line flips inwards to outflank the headstrong Roman infantry

Hannibal's Spanish and Gaulish cavalry mercenaries stood on his left flank opposite the Roman cavalry. The Romans, in addition to never respecting the efficacy of cavalry in battle, were outnumbered on this side of the field. The other side of the battle pitted Hannibal's Numidian cavalry -- undoubtedly the known world's most deadly horsemen -- against the Roman auxiliary cavalry. Crucially, Hannibal instructed his cavalry on the army's left flank to quickly and assuredly drive their combatants from the field. They did this. And then they flew behind and around the infantry battle to support their Numidian confederates. Keep in mind, this was part of Hannibal's original plan.

After defeating all Roman cavalry units and driving them from the field, the now combined forces of Carthaginian cavalry -- numbering probably 7,500-8,000 after their initial combat -- wheeled round 180 degrees and charged headlong into the backs of the Roman infantry. This last maneuver, also planned, snapped the lid shut on the now panicking Roman foot soldiers.

This is very important. Before the Carthaginians fully enveloped the Roman infantrymen, Rome and her allies had begun to experience a high rate of casualties, but a large majority of the original army's strength was still fighting on the field. The slaughter which ensued, however, upon the arrival of the Carthaginian cavalry has rarely, if ever, been equalled in history for its ferocity or for its mechanical precision.

The Romans were still grouped tightly together and therefore were suffering from a small perimeter, a constricted surface area upon which they could deploy their forces. Think of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division's defense of Bastogne against the German army during the Second World War. The U.S. paratroopers chose not to position their firing line in the town proper because doing so would restrict the range of fire they hoped to secure. Instead they defended the town's outskirts so as to efficiently maximize each soldier's potential to fire down and across range. At Cannae the Romans suffered under their own mass as they were prohibited from deploying an adequate portion of their entire force.

For hours the Carthaginians hacked away at the outer shell of the shrinking Roman blob. We are told that most soldiers were prevented from even lifting their shields or swords to defend themselves. Most died at the hands of their enemies, but others suffocated to death in the mob's crush, and a significant number of soldiers chose to kill themselves in a clean fashion. After hours of this horrendous slaughter Rome and her allies suffered, approximately, 54,000-75,000 deaths, depending on the historical source. What a horrible scene it must have been.

Hannibal outwitted his opposing general, outmaneuvered his adversary's troops, and, through sheer gravitas, convinced a large portion of his men to do the impossible. His double-envelopment strategy was and still is marveled at today as a battlefield masterpiece. During the outbreak of the Second World War Nazi Germany unleashed its "Lighting War," or Blitzkrieg. Crafted and championed by Field Marshal Heinz Guderian, the German armored onslaught through Poland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and -- most spectacularly -- France was a modern, direct adaptation of Hannibal's envelopment maneuvers at Cannae. More recently, U.S. Army General "Stormin'" Norman Schwarzkopf deployed coalition armored divisions into sweeping flank attacks, coupled with a solid front-line engagement of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi military. His envelopment of the Iraqi forces was a textbook imitation of Hannibal's tactics at Cannae, and the General said so himself.


While Hannibal's victory is admired I doubt it will be equalled in quality if for no other reason than its aggressive novelty. Notwithstanding the battle's successful conclusion for Hannibal, Cannae is at the top of a very short list of battles which should be collectively viewed as historical phenomena, not just a grouping of first among equals.  

Gifting a Green Bean Casserole: Social Capital Update

Where has the heart of the community gone to?     

     Who among you wants to hear some good news? Who yearns for a bit of gospel? Whose bones, beside mine, are hungry for that sustenance so vital for holistic growth? If you or a friend/family member of yours have tuned in to these questions with eager anticipation, then I have encouraging answers for the lot of you all. To hear them will only require a moment of your time.

     Building off of the attention paid to and theme of my latest post, "Social Capital as a Remedy for Our Modern 'State of Nature,'" I can thankfully report that my effort to build Social Capital -- by baking a 4th of July dish for my neighbor -- succeeded by every measure imaginable. Not only did my neighbor, Dennis, accept my green bean casserole with open and affectionate arms, but he also repaid my act with more consideration than I expected would be forthcoming.

     He genuinely appreciated my gift. However tasty or filling my dish may have been, his reaction -- after the initial surprise -- was a wave of elation that shown through his emotions. He actually invited me into his home for a beer after I gave him the dish. I'm not sure if he responded thusly as a matter of form or genuine appreciation, but I was flattered nonetheless. I politely declined because I planned to meet with a friend soon thereafter, but our exchange was refreshing. We parted with kind words and giddy enthusiasm. Honestly, giving Dennis that gift was an electric feeling because it felt so free of social constraints or obligations. 

     The following day -- the 5th of July -- I was busy hacking away at my pile of golf balls in my backyard with a handful of old, rusty clubs that I had collected over the years. Dennis had watched me from time-to-time with aloof interest as someone watches a deer cross the open road; better if one watches while not disturbing. He was keen to observe but not interact. On only a handful of instances can I remember him offering a friendly tip or word of flattering encouragement. But the day following our 4th of July exchange, out walked Dennis from the side of his house with a shiny golf club in-hand. Strolling up to me with a slick grin across his face, he came close and this is what he said,

"Cory, we don't talk a lot, but I was really happy the other day when you took the time to give me that dish; that was really nice of you and I appreciated that..." 

He paused for a moment to jack the club up into both of his hands and looked down at it like he was weighing the value of it. He lifted his arms from his waist, hands open but cupping the club gently and with such severity as if it were a sword re-forged from the crafty hands of the elvish-kind from Rivendell in the Lord of the Rings. He spoke up and said,

"I've had this club sitting in my basement for awhile, now, and I haven't used it for years because I don't play anymore. I see you practicing all the time and thought you could use another wedge."

     I remember the way he lifted the club and offered it to me; his seriousness surprised me. I noticed how polite he was to not mention how shitty my rusted clubs were when he said,

 "... and thought you could use another wedge." 

Not a good wedge or better wedge, only another wedge. I was struck by his posture, his demeanor, his approach, all of which showed either deference or a sense of formality that -- at the time -- seemed out-of-place but upon reflection were the very types of tailored reactions I had hoped for. Only later that day did I appreciate the degree to which our relationship had evolved from one of a casual nature to one of an interwoven, more complex, and valuable variety. Unwittingly or not, we had crossed a threshold: behind lay the passive, at-arms-length treatment of our interactions which were punctuated by the passing nod, wave, or meaningless greeting that is more often dis-engaging than it is engaging. Beyond lay the full-range of active, contributive relations made possible by a simple exchange of gifts. We had shared an antiquated swap of material things the act of which was notable more for the emotional effect it had upon us than any physical benefit we may have enjoyed. 

     I told Dennis, of course, that I couldn't accept his gift because it's value was worth far more than my simple casserole. How did he respond?

"Are you kidding?!?! You baked a casserole for me. That took time and effort. God knows I can't cook. That was a nice gesture and is worth more than any golf club," 

he said before shaking my hand in confirmation of the deal and his firm insistence that I accept the club. He then told me to have fun before he turned to walk back to his household, Friday chores. 

     I stood there for a moment trying hard to grasp the weight of what had occurred given the theme which my last blog post had specifically dealt with. In that treatment of Social Capital, I had hypothesized that he would respond to my spontaneous -- but no less genuine -- gesture with a similarly kind act of selfless consideration. Only, I had hoped he would respond in kind by helping me work out the construction of a crude back-yard garden. But beggars aren't choosers and my hypothesis was confirmed by experimentation in a technical sense if only lacking in quality. Sure, Dennis did not assist my gardening efforts, but I also hadn't started that project in the first place. His reciprocation, however, was immediate, genuine, and valuable. 

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     I don't mean to build a convenient case for the idea of Social Capital as an answer for the social ills that plague American communities. To use the story from above as a panacea for communal-strife witnessed throughout the U.S. would be to lend too much value to anecdotal evidence or to confuse correlation with causation. In other words, "A blind squirrel finds an acorn every now and then." With that said, this exchange between my neighbor and I has excited a certain node within my thought process where the arteries of theory and experience meet. I've fed the experimental hunger of my academic work but have only begun to calm that voracious appetite. It  calls for more tests and further action.

     Perhaps I should leverage the nascent upsurge of goodwill felt between myself and Dennis by replicating an act of similar or of a more ambitious character. Maybe I should try to affect a similarly positive reaction from a different neighbor of mine. Or, if time and effort should allow, I could do both at the same time. If momentum builds, my focus upon door-to-door relationships could gravitate towards the realm of a goal with more mass and ambition: a neighborhood-wide exchange of old belongings or the organization of a monthly cook-out. This brainstorming taps into the bottomless well of activities that are both capable and efficient means of generating Social Capital.

     Again, I must reiterate a point made from my last post: generating Social Capital requires efforts that might seem counterintuitive because they are done for free and offer no immediate value to those performing the actions which generate that capital. After all, why should I take the time to bake a casserole for my neighbor? There's no guarantee that he will reciprocate, or even return my dish for that matter. That chance of a null effect is eminently plausible. And yet, the opposite effect is eminently plausible, too. And along with reciprocation comes the added benefit of an upgraded, more integrated relationship between individual members of the community. 

     The eventual goal of these efforts to build Social Capital within a community is to achieve a level of involvement and active, contributive participation by individual members of the community which is self-sustaining. Any community that achieves this status will look inwards to solve problems as they arise by employing resources internal to the group instead of relying on assistance from a third party. This community will have low crime because its ethical standards will be locally appropriate, explicit, and accessible to all. Community-wide activities should occur both spontaneously and according to static schedules which are widely communicated. Individual members of the community should find assistance forthcoming from their neighbors should they need it, and such assistance should be offered as an end in-and-of-itself, with no strings attached. Crucially, each member of the model community of which I speak should acknowledge their responsibilities within the community as a list of explicit, productive duties to be performed, not for the sake of the individual's well-being, but for the sake of the health of the community. 

     Keep in mind, duties performed for the community's sake will ultimately benefit the individual, but that effect could be neither immediate nor direct. To neglect one's duties within the community, however, is to trigger the first domino that initiates the "Free-Rider" wave. As this process progresses, individual members violate their social contract with the community with increasing frequency, and as the number of violations mounts the cooperative pressure that pumps the group's life-blood eases until no connections -- or a negligible amount -- exist to sustain the community. It is nearly impossible to arrest this process within a community because irrationality weighs heavy upon the longer, more pragmatic view which most community members are accustomed to seeing. 

     Better to not let this Free-Rider dilemma -- this sharp apathy -- take hold within one's community. To do so, communities need two essential types of members: 

• (1) leaders to exercise a strategic vision of their community's future which is defined by: 
• (a) current trends of finance, demographics, locations, economy, etc., and 
• (b) the ability to manufacture a community-wide adaptability to the full range of unforeseen opportunities and threats that are bound to foist themselves upon the most meticulously-laid plans; and 

• (2) tireless, everyday enthusiasts whose active lifestyles maintain a reliable and visible daily reminder of the community's physical existence (through walking clubs, crossing-guard stations for elementary school bus-stops, maintaining cork post-boards, street trash clean-up, etc.) 

The remainder of community members will naturally follow the lead of these two crucial types of leaders; most people take their social cues from community leaders and it is this tendency that we should rely upon and exploit to ensure community resilience.

"Social capital" refers to features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit."

     - Robert D. Putnam, "The Prosperous Community," The American Prospect vol. 4 no. 13,   March 21, 1993, pp. 2.  

Social Capital as a Remedy for Our Modern 'State of Nature'

BETTER TOGETHER: Restoring the American Community by Robert D. Putnam and Lewis M. Feldstein with Don Cohen (Simon and Shuster; September 10, 2003)

150 ways to generate Social Capital on your own.

Stories of successful efforts to generate Social Capital.

     I was turned on to the idea of Social Capital after reading Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community by Robert D. Putnam (New York: Simon and Shuster; 2000). Professor David Moscowitz from Roger Williams University used the lessons drawn  from Putnam's study to diagnosis the sickness which plagues our American republican institutions (It pains me to do so, but I must give credit where credit is due and have therefore chosen to give kudos to Professor Moscowitz.)

     At its most fundamental level, the idea of Social Capital can be explained by studying the interpersonal relationships between individuals whose actions directly affect one another within a social group. These relationships are typified by their subtle delivery of non-monetary value between individuals on the one hand, and the cumulative health of the entire community which is seemingly borne out of thin air, immaculately conceived, on the other hand. Block parties, bowling leagues (Putnam's favorite example), neighborhood watches, baby-sitting, house-warming gifts, Christmas parties, etc., are but a few of the activities Putnam identifies that generate Social Capital.

     Simply listing these activities shows one that Social Capital is a topic more dynamic than most would think. More than funding or income levels, Social Capital is the lifeblood of a community, the latter of which in its most basic form is the chosen vehicle for organizing the members of society into complex yet stable groups. The common factor that each community identifies as its binding agent can take many forms, but that factor is important enough to convince individual members that 'belonging' is valuable. When the value individuals expect from their membership in the group disappears so, too, does the community vanish. Communities are fluid systems; members come and go as the group's organizing principle is subject to change. For some, qualitative changes of a community's raison d'etre can not be tolerated and so they leave. For others, that same change is tolerable, and for another group the change might prompt them to join the community. The important insight for me is that most community's manage philosophical and structural changes very well; rarely does a community undergo a change so dramatic that it ceases to exist soon thereafter.  And yet, communities are fragile phenomena. The idea of a 'community' is nothing more than an idea so long as the individuals who make-up that community refuse to express loyalty to the group in exchange for social value. Loyalty is felt for a group if its members share both a reasonably similar vision with one another and a belief that their collective efforts, when directed towards the pursuit of that vision, will bear fruit. Self-interest still exists, of course, but individuals loyal to a healthy community learn to subordinate their immediate desires in order to capture the benefits only attainable by a community. Communities, in all of their shapes, sizes, and operations, most often flourish and grow when their members secure the bonds of trust and confidence between one another. Trust and confidence, if plentiful, lubricate the community's delicate need to use collaboration as its modus operandi, and in-so-doing achieving what on the face of things looks to be a counterintuitive act. Collaboration is an end in-and-of-itself among community members and the value they create is Social Capital.

     If we take a moment to survey the landscape of our country's community structures it doesn't take long to notice that collaborative efforts at every level of society are few and far between. Coupled with this indifference, an elite class of autocrats and powerful personages work at the moral fringe of the rule of law, manipulate the legislative processes to favor their interests, and additionally leverage their abilities to work through loopholes and dense legal frameworks in order to monopolize power. The class of the elite is no monolith, but its preferential access to republican levers of power is highly problematic from both a theoretical and actual viewpoint.

To the general public, the specter of an elite class siphoning off scare resources and influence only aggravates the offense. If the common citizen believes the republic to be corrupted thusly, and if he is unable to remedy his poor position through legal or democratic channels, then he must eventually abandon the last vestiges of faith in his republic. If he felt anger and frustration before in the face of corruption, he will next show signs of civic exhaustion and despair, both of which work upon his conscience until he settles into a type of lethargic citizenship. Instead of seeking redress for himself or closing ranks with his under-represented comrades, the now disillusioned man focuses his efforts inwards towards himself, his career, his family, etc., because to do otherwise would be to squander valuable time and resources upon a lost cause. The moment our citizen chooses not to actively participate in the mechanics of his republic is the moment his social contract has broken. Sure, he will still live within the realm of and be subject to the authority of republican institutions, but in a way the authority those institutions wield is not legitimate. Notwithstanding his attempts in the past to redress his injuries through constitutional means - rather, perhaps in spite of them - our citizen can only find justice if some outside, systemic change re-calibrates the weight of representation each class deserves. If he finds himself hoping for such a fortuitous deliverance then he will unknowingly do himself harm; his lethargic attitude towards politics will suddenly be punctuated by flashes of anger and deeply bitter, shamefully regretful reminders of the chasm between what his republic owes him on the one hand and the paltry amount he has received on the other. Perhaps, even, under extreme circumstances he will mistrust and then dismiss his moment of deliverance because his helpless position has shattered the frame of reference through which he would normally use to judge political considerations.

      What's important to note is that this process which ends in isolation - or the construction of silos within which the individual and his nuclear family restrict their civic activities to - this degeneration away from republican activism washes over the brim of an individual's life and into that of the community. As the members of a community start to individually turn inwards, and concern themselves more often with self-preservation instead of collective security, the bonds that hold the disparate parts of the communal whole break one-by-one and do so with increasing regularity. Eventually, this process of communal dissociation picks up enough violent momentum to ensure the community's death. Perhaps more discouraging than the actual death of the community, is the pitiful phenomenon of neighbors living in close proximity to one another but who have little to no interaction and therefore no chance of generating Social Capital. With time, interaction between neighbors practically ceases because each actor's appreciation for civic action has atrophied beyond hope. The next generation will be born as civic introverts; not only would Social Capital be seen as a truly peculiar idea, but this new generation would actually believe that their private lives and spheres of influence were the norm, not the exception.

     When self-preservation is valued more than collective-security/collaboration by the public, only an unforeseen political cataclysm can resurrect the ideal of republicanism. And that shift is oftentimes a very messy ordeal. More than likely, however, the new norm -- individual self-preservation -- will endure. We are nearing this shift in the U.S. and all of the signs indicate that community structures are so weak that they might not withstand the stress of a republican revival. This atmosphere, in a modern sense, can be thought to parallel Hobbes' more brutal "State of Nature," an image of society he used to illustrate the formation of the first human communities. While Hobbes' "State of Nature" posed real, existential threats to its inhabitants, today's reincarnation of Hobbes' illustration has all of the logical hallmarks of the original. If the members of local communities focused more upon day-to-day, intimate burden-sharing amongst themselves, then many of our national problems would vanish. But we are heading in the opposite direction. Communities fall to bitter infighting as blame is assigned to everyone like a hot potato. Frugal residents complain about expenses or taxes they pay to support services they barely use. Those who have had stable upbringings fail to empathize with those who lacked that foundation and no allowance is made on the grounds that "life isn't fair." We must swallow our pride at times in order to accept that our neighbors may simply have fallen on hard times. We need to have faith in the idea that an honest deed done for someone else for free can be more rewarding than a paycheck. Value takes many forms and it is hidden within our communities; it is our duty to mine for it using the right tools and practice.

     Today's 'State of Nature,' unlike Hobbe's original articulation of that brutish life, does not pose an existential threat to individuals and families, not yet at least. But the same underlying logic that fed Hobbe's anarchic, chaotic life of self-interested brutes and clans is present today and it undermines any semblance of social security. Whether one analyzes cheating within the nation's tax system, insider trading on Wall Street, library late fees, increasing rates of traffic within the nation's major cities, etc., it becomes patently clear that individuals are more willing - by a large margin - to act in their best interests than they are to engage in collaborative efforts. It's not enough to believe or claim that self-interest and collaboration are mutually exclusive options; they are not, as is shown by the classic 'Prisoner's Dilemma': collaboration satisfies the interests of all those concerned.

     However, in the Prisoner's Dilemma the suspects are motivated by a clear, tangible goal: avoiding a long prison sentence. To come full circle, this discussion must show that the American public can no longer identify a worthy goal to direct its efforts towards. Collaboration is dismissed because the public doubts the legitimacy of the social institutions and legal frameworks within which collaboration is supposed to operate. It's as if burden-sharing or collective action are risky endeavors because neither are able to gain traction, ultimately exhausting themselves leaving the public more tired and bitter than before. This positive feedback system has been looping for some time now and, in my opinion, a critical threshold for pain and frustration will be crossed shortly in America.

     While those in power are, to all appearances, actively aggravating some of the causes and the symptoms of the nation's sickness, most of the blame rests with everyday Joes and Janes. An encouraging ray of hope still shines from the same idea of communities which I did my best to criticize above. In effect, the structure and operation of communities are so fluid that they can spring to life as fast as, or faster than, the time it takes for their predecessors to dissolve. If we can not bring ourselves to offer our loyalty to the community of the nation because it is a corrupt bargain, then we should look closer to home for inspiration. The lower and middle classes need to once again invest their time and effort into their neighborhoods in the hopes of constructing the valuable bonds of collaboration that generate Social Capital. More block parties, bringing a favorite cooked recipe to a neighbor's house during the holidays, organizing a volunteer street-cleaning crew, organizing pick-up basketball games at the local park, assisting young parents with baby-sitting and tutoring, etc. Take a look at the list linked above, pick out a few of the easier tasks you feel comfortable with and do them, no questions asked. I for one plan to bake a green-bean casserole for my new(er) next-door neighbor for the upcoming Fourth of July. I expect neither a reward nor an immediate reciprocation, but I guarantee that our relationship - between myself and Dennis - will become more dynamic. Maybe in the not too distant future he'll remember that shitty casserole - at least the effort I put into it - and the warmth he feels inside will prompt him to help me with my garden I plan on digging.

     And eventually, as you cross off tasks and your stock of Social Capital accumulates ever higher, hopefully you will graduate to more ambitious labors. Perhaps you will organize an after-school parent-teacher tutoring service for struggling students. Maybe you'll mentor troublesome adolescents. While the list of opportunities will present themselves ad infinitum, the bedrock of your philosophy should never change: a community that organizes itself around the natural attraction between its members can only survive if those same members work for an ideal that transcends self-interest or material benefits. Within some recess of each individual's conscience, space must be kept for a stoic appreciation of republican foundations, the mortar of persistent civic duty, and the peculiar community-facades that are as variegated as they are familiar to their members.

Random Thoughts Upon (Still) Desperate Times

     (cont'd) The American republic - the rule of law more specifically - needs to be reinvigorated. We need a new constitution. Legal integrity needs to be upheld with a degree of vigilance similar to republican Rome: lying in court (perjury) was considered so heinous an act that the guilty person would be thrown to their death from a cliff onto a jagged rock. Marion Jones lied during a Department of Justice inquiry and was given a slap on the wrist. If caught accepting bribes while serving as a public servant, Roman officials would first have their nose cut off before they were stuffed and sewn into a large bag with a wild animal and then finally tossed into a raging river to either drown to death or eaten by the animal. 

     I surely do not recommend we resuscitate these punishments from antiquity to lend more legitimacy to our legal system. However, the modern American legal system is plagued by double-standards, biases, dishonestly, and a faithlessness that is so acute that the entire system is seen by most Americans as a vehicle to be manipulated by actors within society instead of the other way around. 

     We need to end the "Tyranny of the Legislature": implement consecutive term-limits for Senators and Representatives in order to nip the "re-election" effort in the bud. Or we could elect Congressmen for terms to take place in the future instead of soon after ballots are cast. Even better, anonymous elections! Sure, we've have great presidents, but republics are not sustained by the executive branch. Rather, it was the sage legislators such as the Spartan Lycurgus or the Athenians Solon or Draco whose cool-headed, systemic organization of republican institutions gave to posterity an ideal to marvel at and imitate. 

     Today, the solutions to most of the problems that plague our economy, society, and political institutions reveal themselves with little to no effort. In other words, we know how to succeed as a nation - or at the very least how to control the damage - yet Congress is unwilling to act. In effect, Congress can not do its job! And yet we tolerate Congressional incompetence because we either believe no remedy exists or that the status quo works well enough. On both counts we are mistaken. 

     I understand that dramatic changes to, inter alia, our tax code, Electoral College, capital and financial debt markets, etc., should be implemented with care in order to avoid unnecessary shocks to society. But for the love of all that you hold dear: When are we going to control our nation's fucking debt!?!? When, if ever, will Congress reconfigure the nation's social safety nets in order to ensure either their affordability on the one hand, or control the runaway prices of services on the other? It's incredible. Our nation's Constitution is a quaint reminder of what a republican ideal used to be. "Oh, what a nice document! How peculiar!?" or we simultaneously cling to that mythical belief that ours' is the most just and free republic while we see with our own eyes how our institutions have grown hollow and corrupt. The checks, balances, and restrictions placed within and upon our republican form of government are overridden and side-stepped by an elite class of plutocrats to whom corporate bodies owe their allegiance, and vice versa. What our republic once was and what it is today are two wholly different things and, sadly, no effort to revive the former by rebuilding the latter has sprung to life. 

     The Arab spring of recent years and contemporary protests in Turkey and Brazil have shown us how to right these wrongs. What's more, we laud the courageous efforts of the citizens from these states as they demanded honest representation through democratic activism. They bled and often died for the republican ideal. "Good for them! They are taking back their democracy," we say but then turn off the television and think of those lessons no more. Our jobs and the paychecks they deliver dictate how we define our republic. To be certain, work and pay are necessary, but there exists a short list of ideals to which we as a community should strive to realize and maintain; republicanism is at the top of that list. Material things, money, and social status can neither - for the most part - nourish our conscience nor fulfill our desire to find an answer or meaning to life. A smaller paycheck or less affluent lifestyle are paltry trade-offs for the enjoyment of true liberty, active democracy, and healthy republican institutions. When and if we shift our focus to demand these types of priorities, then we will see how far we have strayed from the path of philosophical righteousness. But what will it take for that threshold to be crossed? 

     The body-politic in the U.S. is activated by a fitful and sputtery motor. High voter turnout is no longer driven by the issues of the day, but by the race or gender of the President, or the raging public/private civil wars at the state and local levels. "Politics," to all intents, constructions, and purposes, has leap-frogged the idea of being divisive or a 'touchy' subject; to fish for a political discussion in most social circles is to invite disaster, punish oneself, be ironic, etc. To talk about politics is to talk about a naturally distasteful subject. Could I think of a warning sign, a red-flag more indicative of a dying body-politic? Other than a coup, I think not. 

     Our aspirations and actions look to me like Eisenberg's electron in his elegant "Uncertainty Principle": chaotic in nature, an electron moves around its shell, or the electron cloud, in a purely random fashion. In order for a scientist to observe that electron during its fitful travels, he must observe that electron in a single instant, like a camera snapshot. Viewed in this way, the scientist can observe the electron with remarkable clarity. And yet, because the scientist is viewing the electron frozen in time, he must therefore forfeit his ability to observe the speed at which the electron is moving, or in what direction it is traveling. To observe the electron on the one hand, and to chart its movement on the other, is to confront two mutually exclusive choices. 

     Likewise in America we are incapable of simultaneously articulating goals - or a strategic aim - and acting in accordance with those goals, or at the very least how reality treats our goals. U.S. support for representational government the world over is, in theory, universally accepted. But when one analyzes our recognition (or lack-there-of) of Middle Eastern political parties/movements, one is unable to confirm our republican credentials. It wrinkles our brain to entertain the idea that a strategy can - indeed, should - be pursued in the face of chaos and uncertainty. A state can not articulate a grand strategy and control reality at the same time. Our domestic affairs are no different. "Affordable credit for young, middle-income homebuyers as a goal? Awesome!" "We've found a new way to effectively package a bundle of different mortgages into a single portfolio for optimal cash flow? That's fucking amazing! And it's legal? Sweet Baby Jesus!" BAM! Worst recession since the Great Depression. "What's that? The justice system is popularly thought to be unfair, rigged, and downright broken? Damn, that sucks. We should have the nation's first ever black President promise to make government more transparent, help the middle/lower-income families, hold banks and large corporations responsible for irresponsible actions, punish 'white-collar' crime more vigorously. Yeah, that will breath trust, confidence, and life back into our democratic foundations!" BAM! God damn National Security Agency (NSA) hacked the entire nation and Guantonomo is STILL open!

Random Thoughts Upon Desperate Times (Part 1)

Lycurgus

     

     The Athenian republic did not fall after the Great Peloponnesian War (431 - 404 BC). Far from it. Athenian republicanism survived for another hundred years. I repeat: the Athenian republic did not fall until 322 BC. Philip II of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, destroyed Athenian republicanism. For an honest, contemporary treatment of that final death-struggle, one need only read Demosthenes' "Phillipics". That group of orations laments - inter alia - local corruption at the highest level of government, citizen apathy, and the perils of hiring a mercenary army to fight one's own battles. 

     "The only thing that stays the same is the antagonistic behavior of states." That claim seeks to sweep over the particulars of international relations like a matador's muleta hides the horns of a Spanish bull. Come now, let us try a bit harder. Are states deliberately antagonistic? No. The complex system of international relations - state to state relations - pushes states this way and that, arrests state progress with no warning, propels state movement when time and momentum are thought to have frozen, and this uncertainty - this CHAOS - is often identified by observers to be the necessary and sufficient cause of a state's health. We are mistaken to think that it is the system that controls states. States are phantoms if their social institutions disappear. 

     The Roman republic was laid low from within, during the upswing of that state's growth. Beginning in earnest with Marius and Sulla, thrown into overdrive by Gaius Julius Caesar, and finished by Octavian (soon to be Augustus Caesar) after his civil struggle with Mac Antony, the legal and constitutional institutions of republican Rome were destroyed by the elite class. Marius reformed the structure of the army and rewarded his troops with massive booty. While this threshold was crossed by Scipio (Africanus) after his defeat of Hannibal (202 BC), profit and treasure were not the envy of legionarres until Marius and Sulla served as Consuls. Julius Caesar and his triumvirate colleague (one of them) Gnaeus Pompey institutionalized this profiteering norm as the Levant and Mediterranean coastline were taken hold of, first, by Pompey, followed shortly thereafter by Caesar's conquest of Gaul. After the latter of these two men achieved his Pyrrhic victory of that civil war, he was soon assassinated by Brutus, Cassius, and Co: the Senatorial republicans who saw tyranny for what it was (Fun fact: before his assasination, Caesar changed his will to bequeath roughly 3/4's of his wealth and estate, along with his name, to his nephew Octavian, but should the latter not accept that dangerous inheritance then guess who was next in line for Caesar's willful favor? BRUTUS!!!). Octavian and Marc Antony - Julius Caesar's 1st Lieutenant - quickly locked horns with one another, burdening the Roman body politic with the second bloody civil war in a single generation. Triumphant, Caesar Augustus dismantled the Roman republic (27 BC) after rewriting the constitution. The SYSTEM within which Rome acted had no effect upon the dramatic shift from republic to empire. 

     There is a period of grandeur which follows the establishment of any repubic in history, and yes, history does repeat itself. Classical Athens and republican Rome burst outwards upon and into the system of international relations because the rule of law and the strength of the citizen body-politic complemented one another. This symbiotic relationship was - and is - the sine qua non of the foundation of republican institutions. With time, however, - and to varying degrees - the general body-politic becomes either apathetic or indifferent towards civic participation. In and of themselves, apathy and indifference are not capable of taking the legs out from below a republic; a more active, pernicious effort is required by the elite class to sully accepted norms. At this point in the life of a republic, the rule of law is still in force and governs the actions and behaviors of a majority of citizens. However, a minority of actors - the elite plutocrats - takes it upon itself to slyly work at the fringe of legal boundaries to seize opportunities. Whether these opportunities manifest themselves as monetary gains, political power, etc., is no matter. It is the sense of unfairness that the everyday Joe and Jane perceive that matters. They see the rich and powerful as capable, willing, and eager gluttons. The rich and powerful elite are seen to 'rollover' their success at little to no cost to themselves on the one hand, while disenfranchising the low to middle class workers on the other. When confidence within, and trust of, republican institutions disappears, then those very institutions vanish like the ephemeral dreams they are. 

     The American republic is teetering upon a precipice because. While the rule of law was used to build the state's democratic institutions, the elite are working to gain more power while acting contrary to what Montesquie termed "The Spirit of the Laws". Campaign finance is a web of re-allocated, mysterious channels; the Electoral College and 'gerrymandering' are relied upon by institutional actors to stratify and strategize legislative/executive power; an objective media presence does not exist; wealth and value have pooled along the corners of the national economy as a result of finance; the nation's top political leaders are incapable - indeed, CANNOT - tell the truth and we know this; the "ability to govern" is a distant consideration of legislators who are above all else intent upon re-election campaigns; the national and state legal codes would befuddle a Byzantine government official; and, most depressing of all, ordinary citizens are told what is legal, how law is to be interpreted, and how the nation's code of ethics should be updated as a result instead of the process of legal interpretation growing organically from the body-politic. 

Solon

     To recap: (1) the Athenian republic did not fall after the Great Peloponnesian War: Philip II ended that dream nearly one-hundred years later. (2) The Roman republic was dismantled from within by the elite class. Period. (3) The system within which states act is chaotic, yes, but states can rise or fall from their own inertia just as easy as sudden, outside shocks. (4) The rule of law is the seed from which republicanism grows, but as that plant grows to maturity it must be cared for and attended to lest some of the "healthy" branches use their pride of place to capture a disproportional amount of sunlight and in so doing gorge themselves while choking the life out of the entire plant's body. (5) History not only repeats itself when we look at the rise and fall of republics, but it is a narrative from which we see the rule of law borne, grow, and then manipulated as a five-dollar-hooker. As she is jaded, so does a republic violate and contradict the very institutions upon which it derives its life.