The Modern City-State, Part II

"I change too quickly: my today refutes my yesterday. When I ascend I often jump over steps, and no step forgives me that." 

"Oh great star! What would your happiness be if you did not have us to shine for?"  

- Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra

      Globalization is a contemporary word for what history has shown to be a group of reoccurring phenomenon: the spread of disruptive technologies, migrant populations, capital, ideas, etc., across state borders. Contemporary globalization is simultaneously undermining a facet of state sovereignty on the one hand while further embedding cities into the fabric of International Relations (IR) on the other. Far from a period of decline, however, states are still the primary actors in IR and as such, are the foundation upon which today's state-centric system of IR rests.

      Exercising less formal authority than their national overlords do, cities increasingly act as release valves for the state; they lessen the degree to which pressures of globalization work upon and through state borders. Today we undoubtedly live in a world that is undergoing a period of authoritative re-calibration (re-territorialization) whereby states writ large are failing to manage the forces both within and without of society, economics, finance, security, etc. But make no mistake: this period of adjustment will approach an equilibrium sooner or later.

      This is not only expected but welcomed because, whatever faults or weaknesses the Westphalian, state-centric model of IR may harbor today, society has yet to design a better system to manage international affairs. And yet, the steady march of urban expansion, connectivity, and evolution in the past couple of decades has progressed in lock-step  with the establishment of a more accommodating socio-economic regime within which cities have nested themselves. In other words, cities are more wealthy, numerous, healthy, and connected than they've ever been in the past. Most cities enjoy protection from foreign militaries: the cosmopolitan city - however autonomous it may be - resides within national borders and is therefore subject to state-centric domestic legal structures and authorities. In contrast, classical Greek city-states valued liberty over collective security and - the Greek alliance against the Persian invaders notwithstanding - as a result, every individual city-state fell prey to, first, the Macedonians and then Rome. Today's 'city-states' - New York, Chicago, Hong Kong, Doha, Dubai, etc., - are thankfully not responsible for their own security. This has enabled the modern city to focus more of its attention toward, inter alia, capital accumulation, expansion of their service sectors, and trade networks. At least since the late 1970's, cities have leveraged this comparative advantage to secure and strengthen more power within the state-centric arena of IR. And as the number of large, commercial cities continues to expand within and across state borders, both their relative power vis a v. the state and their absolute power in international affairs will increase exponentially.

      This development is encouraging because the state as the principal actor within IR is finding itself frequently unable or ill-suited to manage social, economic, financial, cultural, etc., issues in a globalizing society. This doesn't mean, however, that the state-centric system is doomed. Far from it. In fact, the relative power of states in military and managerial terms has grown rapidly since the end of World War II. How can that be? How can the state simultaneously lose and gain power in international affairs? Wouldn't the result of globalization as a negative force, and military expansion as a positive force, cancel out each other thereby having a neutral effect upon state sovereignty? The answers to these questions are easy to answer so long as one understands that the institution - the principle - of sovereignty is not unified, but very dynamic.

      When most people think of sovereignty, they are thinking of what IR scholars - particularly Stephen Krasner - call "Westphalian Sovereignty", or the universal legal protection of states from foreign intervention. The norm of non-intervention began to be codified after the conclusion of the central European Thirty Years' War between, amongst many others, the Holy Roman Empire and its souther-German allies on one side, against Protestant (more or less) northern-German principalities, Sweden, and - eventually - France. The Holy Roman Empire was ruled by the Habsburg Dynasty which, in 1521, split into two family branches that resided on opposite sides of continental Europe. The senior branch resided in Spain while the junior branch governed from Austria. The conflict lasted for thirty years and decimated the population of central Europe, particularly the populations of the Germanic principalities: some 30% of the citizenry died in the heart of Europe. The respective combatant rulers were so moved by the war's devastation that they brought an end to the conflict and began the process of reconciliation whereby it was decided that each prince (sovereign ruler for that matter) had the exclusive right of determining the religion of his lands and, as a result, the religion of his subjects. (read: the Protestant Reformation and Catholic counter-Reformation triggered the war by divorcing huge swaths of populations and lands from their former Catholic overlords). This right of religious exclusivity given to sovereign rulers was the foundation for today's international norm of non-intervention. Interestingly enough, the Peace of Westphalia also required rulers to honor universal minority rights: Protestant Lutheranism and Calvinism were given the status of full socio-politico legitimacy, freeing those individuals who were religious minorities from confessional persecution. After all, the truest catalyst for the war's beginning was the Habsburg's strategy of minority persecution at the local level and institutional marginalization of Protestants at the Imperial level. So in a way, the Peace of Westphalia established conflicting norms: the universal norm of non-intervention on the one hand, and continental protections accorded to religious minorities on the other.

      Here is where most discussions of sovereignty end, but in so doing they fail to capture the other institutional dynamics of sovereignty. Would you believe that, in addition to non-intervention/Westphalian sovereignty, there exist today three (3) more types of sovereignty? That was a rhetorical question; they exist.

1. International Legal Sovereignty - according to Krasner (2002): "Recognized jurisdictionally independent territorial entities which [have] the right to freely decide which agreements or treaties they will enter into" (3). A state with international legal sovereignty can join, for instance, the World Trade Organization (WTO), sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), etc;
2. Effective Domestic Sovereignty - which "implies that there is an independent authority structure within a recognized territory capable of effectively regulating activities within its own borders" (ibid). So is the police apparatus of state X capable of maintaining law and order throughout the territory of the state? Are their pockets of unrest and militant extremism that are so isolated that the central government can not bring them to heel? At this point, one should start to notice that, unlike the purely legal nature of international legal sovereignty, effective domestic sovereignty can be lacking in state with weak central authority structures. Look at Somalia. So to a certain degree, the forces that enable or prohibit a state from controlling events inside its borders can operate against and outside of the state's ability to control them;  
3. Interdependence/Globalization Sovereignty - This is the newest articulation of sovereignty (or is it?), and this type of sovereignty is the one we hear of most often in the news. The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman drew upon his... extensive experience from his... long career as a scholar of international relations (read: he has no experience and, therefore, had no career in that field) to reach the conclusion that technological advances in communication, fiber-optic wiring, cell phones, travel, etc., have collectively "shrunk" the world by reducing the amount of time and space needed to act in today's globalized world, and as a result "The World is Flat". In other words, the state-centric approach to IR analysis is now inappropriate because these advances have, firstly, more or less leveled the playing field between strong and weak state actors and, secondly, enabled non-state actors like NGO's, transnational corporations, and militant extremists, to exert power on the world stage. Friedman's argument is interesting, but absolutely false. Power, or the ability to act, is still the single-most important force in the world today. The U.S. military apparatus and price-tag is larger than its next 14-15 competitors combined. Is that flat? Of course not. 

      Granted, ideas of political equality can permeate through state borders and 'infect' the populations of tyrannical regimes leading to popular protests, viz. the Arab Spring. But most of the now defunct regimes from the Middle East (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya) were brought down from within and after major world powers called for the dictators to step down. While the regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt were relatively bloodless, Libya erupted into all out civil war costing thousands of lives. The death toll from today's raging Syrian civil war has undoubtedly topped 70,000 people. So while Twitter and Facebook served as the platforms through which popular uprisings were channeled, the very real response from authority structures was deadly. Communication networks, ideas, protests, etc., in and of themselves can not topple a regime: only cold steel and hot lead can.

     If one is able to see sovereignty as a multi-faceted - indeed, more complex - system of legal norms, social processes, and power relations then one has the ability to study the modern interaction between the primary agents within the system of IR. The two most important actors in this system are states and cities. It is true that globalizing forces of communication, transport, capital flows, etc., are ceaselessly conflicting with state sovereignty. How states are to compensate for this relative loss of sovereignty is unknown and many states will be forced to discover the answer alone. A more troubling reality will be the inability of weak states to adopt strategies for controlling globalized forces that have been implemented by more powerful states. In effect, the complexity of today's world is inherently chaotic and chaos is the antithesis to the state-centric model of IR.

      An encouraging insight for IR theory is this: while the forces of globalization pose challenges for state authority, these forces are a boon for urban centers, particularly cities. By nature, cities are chaotic, informal, and the processes by which urban institutions manifest themselves are the result of unplanned opportunities just as much as planned initiatives.

      Crucially, however, cities will begin to - and indeed are encouraged to - resemble the ancient city-states of Classical Greece, China, and the early Islamic Caliphate, etc. The key to this reemergence of city-states is the ease with which urbanites construct urban identities. To be a citizen of Athens, Aleppo, Cordoba, Corinth, etc., was to identify oneself as an Athenian, Aleppan, etc., etc., before anything else. Urban identities are more tangible, more salient - more dear - to city-dwellers than the geographic identities of either the state or of the nation. While the developed world struggles to both escape its stagnant economic recovery and reverse negative demographic trends, modern city-states should be encouraged to flourish not only because they are engines of growth, but because they are the most appropriate model for the 21st-century economy.

      As sure as the sun rises from behind the eastern horizon, the city-state is today reborn: shield thicker than before, bronze helmet polished to Athenian-gold, and a Spartan blood-crimson cloak unfurled in the wind.

HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF THE CITY-STATE

A non-Apologetic Appraisal of Hizballah, Hamas, and Political Islam

     If there's any lesson to be drawn from the Boston Marathon bombings it is that Americans will grab for any answer to the dilemma of militant extremism which is neither Islamic nor political by nature. To conjure the specter of "terrorism' - an image clear to the U.S. and Western publics - is to choose the path of least resistance. Terrorism, viewed as a militant corruption of political activism, serves as a convenient, albeit misguided, coping mechanism. Do not misinterpret my intention this early in the post: al-Qaeda perpetrated a heinous act of cold-blooded murder on 9/11, and the Tsaranev brothers are guilty of a similar offense. If I had my chance to exact revenge on bin-Laden (UBL), I'd tell him the same thing Marcellus Wallace told "Zed" he was about to do in Quentin Tarantino's "Pulp Fiction": "I'm gonna' get medieval on your ass!" But after exhausting my efforts of putting UBL through the gauntlet, I suspect a cold feeling of discomfort would continue unabated so long as chaos and uncertainty threatened to disrupt my life.

     It wasn't surprising that most U.S. news agencies speculated that the Boston bombers established connections with the Chechen separatist movement of southern Russia. That speculation was expected and is typical of our media institutions, led by individuals unworthy of Walter Cronkite, David Halberstam, and other paragons of honest journalism. What surprised me was the instantaneous public reaction to this speculation: if it's on T.V. it must be true. Never mind the Tsaranev's upbringing in central Asia's Kyrgyzstan, a state as difficult to locate on a map as is its name is to pronounce (10 street credit points to those who know its capital city!). And let us disregard the fact that the Chechen separatist movement - notwithstanding a particularly horrific episode where hundreds of Russian schoolchildren were murdered in cold blood - has one of the more legitimate claims for independence amongst the spectrum of resistance movements throughout the world. No, these considerations and many more were overridden by the public's need to establish connections, assign blame, in anticipation of the eventual military response against an identified threat which - unsurprisingly - was motivated by that same vein of Salafiyyah militant Islam characteristic of al-Qaeda (not the Taliban: the Taliban's ideology, the Deobandi school of thought, grew out of an Indian sect of missionary Islam (al-dawah) based in the Muslim enclave of Deoband).

     Alas, unless George W. abrogates the Constitution by winning the Presidency once more, it is unlikely that the U.S. public will swallow another pile of bull-shit ala Iraqi WMDs. No, the conclusion to the Boston attack will be more anti-climatic than the public realizes. Ironically, this letdown is the very reason why the public will not rest easy: a ruthless attack perpetrated by 'lone-wolf' outcasts who were motivated by anger and a desire to hurt innocents is more destabilizing than an orchestrated attack. In the meantime, we'll blame political Islam and the phenomenon of Islamic Terrorism.

     By doing so we will stay mired in what George Friedman calls the "Terror Trap" in his book The Next Decade: Empire and Republic in a Changing World (2012). The trap was sprung when the U.S. launched its "War on Terror." How does one defeat terrorism? Rather, how does one defeat a battlefield tactic? It's as if the British sought to defeat the act of 'sniping' carried out by militia sharpshooters during the U.S. Revolutionary War of Independence. To win, the British would have to kill or capture every single person capable of becoming a sniper! Impossible. And what do we make of the D.C. sniper attacks in 2002? The greater D.C. area was gripped with fear as John Allen Muhammad and his younger accomplice Lee Boyd Malvo roamed Interstate 95 in Virgina eventually killing 10 random civilians. After arrested, however, Muhammad and Malvo were tried in Virginia state court for murder instead of terrorism despite all indications that acts of 'Terror,' as we understand the term, were perpetrated. As for the Tsaranev brothers' attack in Boston recently, President Obama tried to indirectly moderate the national discussion through his reluctance to label the attack an "Act of Terror,' and for good reason. In the face of political pressure though, a White House aide quickly placated the American public by confirming, in fact, that the attack was an act of terror because "Whenever multiple bombs are used, it is an act of terror" (paraphrase). Wait a minute? Isn't terrorism the act of instilling fear in the public in order to, inter alia, achieve political goals? So how or why did the Obama administration think it legitimate to label this an act of terror before the perpetrators were arrested and before their motives were known? The truth is is that we've latched on to terrorists as a familiar enemy just like we did during the Cold War; Communism was then the monolithic creature haunting our dreams at night. Better to be haunted by a known enemy than a unknown one, or so the logic demands.

     We have now exposed the truest cause of our need to apply a catch-all phrase, Terrorism, to a infinitely complex array of chaotic forces. The issue is more fundamental than a strategic imperative. Terrorists of today stand in stark moral contrast to extremists from the past. Sure, al-Qaeda and global jihadi groups seek neither political representation nor accommodation. There's is a struggle between civilizations. But what of Hizballah and Hamas? the Shia' resistance movement based in southern Lebanon and the Palestinian terrorist organization pursuing 'self-determination' as a political end by employing military and political means, respectively. Both of these groups are guilty of murder, but murder is not their modus operandi; grassroots political activism is. In fact, they've relied consistently upon political institutions more than missionary or jihadi alternatives. Contrary to secular practice, religion and politics are not mutually exclusive options, and in the case of Islam the two are inextricably linked. Unlike Christianity, the birth of Islam developed in lock-step with a correspondingly successful military campaign that swept through the Arabian Peninsula and across North Africa. The result of that dichotomous relationship between church and state legitimacy was an unimpeded infusion of Islamic ideals into the state apparatus. Social norms and state institutions were built upon Islamic foundations. Christians, on the other hand, were suppressed by the Roman Empire and forced to obey pagan institutions that honored Caesar as God. The one true irony of Western liberal democracy is that its institutions were borne from weakness not an inherent strength that the Muslim Umma lacked.

     How do we categorize the anarchist movements of the nineteenth century? Is it not a mark of progress today that laborers enjoy safe work conditions and reasonable five-day work weeks? Whence did these rights come from? Answer: from the collective strike, the hidden gun, and well-timed bomb. British suffragettes used extreme measures to achieve political ends. "They broke windows, planted bombs, and hurled Molotov cocktails through the windows of politicians' homes, public buildings, and shops" (Norton, On the Muslim Question, 2013, p. 83 ). Their successful efforts informed today's constitutions of the UK, France, and the United States. Women's' right to vote and access to equal pay in the workplace "were, as Nietzsche said of all great things, 'soaked in blood thoroughly, and for a long time' " (Ibid, 85).

     Likewise, the nascent independence movement of the U.S. colonies finally broke free from British suzerainty, not through political machinations, but in spite of them. Only a military struggle achieved what parliamentary democracy could not. Similar to today's resistance movements in Palestine and the Levant, General Washington's regular army and supplement of rag-tag militias refused to lay down their arms as "a precondition for negotiations." It is therefore puzzling that the West so easily labels Hizballah and Hamas as evil forces on the one hand, while romanticizing the exploits of colonial militias on the other.

     We forget to interpret our struggle for independence as an historical precursor to Islamic resistance movements. Our struggle for independence was not a random disruption in our minds, but an explosive reaction to long-simmering forces. Then again, we framed the issue. Because we were actors in that continental drama, the randomness of events and the violent overthrow of the colonial status quo were validations of our political aims. British fear, panic, and unease were the corollaries to our frustration with political servitude, an apathetic crown, and the eventual decision to work outside of British institutions that neither addressed nor respected colonial grievances. These were the reasons the colonies employed militant tactics; tactics considered then by the British and the U.S. today as anathema to liberal democratic institutions.

     Our militant independence movement manifest itself only after non-violent, political petitions for representation were rebuffed. Petitions for a redress from grievances were exhausted. Independence was achieved, but not without a great loss of life and presumable lesson for posterity: in life and death, ends often justify the means.

     After two-and-a-quarter centuries the U.S. enjoyed the status as the pre-eminent superpower - the only superpower - capable of subduing the world with hot lead and warm ideals. 9/11 shattered that confidence, not because al-Qaeda represented an existential threat - it didn't then and surely does not today. Our paranoia was borne from a more pernicious fear of chaos. "When the world becomes uncertain, people feel that a once orderly place has become random. Randomness, when it concerns matters of life and death, of change and an uncertain future, is terrifying" (Ibid, 87). However shocking and disgusting the attacks on 9/11 were a priori, it was the perceived loss of control the U.S. experienced and the introduction into the U.S. hegemonic narrative of chaos that terrified the U.S. public. This rupture was compounded by our naive belief that we had succeeded in establishing a new world order after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, an order built by the U.S. and, for the foreseeable future, controlled by the U.S. While some added control did accrue to U.S. institutions, that development was not the cause but an effect of a power vacuum. Crucially, chaos as a force acting within the field of international relations could never - and will never - be eradicated.

     Al-Qaeda's attack was nothing more than a harbinger of a more chaotic field of unconventional forces working at the seams of an outdated system built upon Westphalian sovereignty. Asymmetric warfare as practiced by, inter alia, Hizballah and Hamas today is relied upon because these groups must redefine the rules of war. Up until the successful resistance of two Israeli invasions of souther Lebanon - in 1982 and 2006 -  separatist movements only succeeded at damage control. The Chechens were bombed into the Neolithic age during their second war with Russia. On the streets mean streets of Balbek in southern Lebanon, however, Hizballah used bottlenecks and blind-spots to effectively deploy their rocket forces. Hamas military victories have proven more allusive for other reasons, chiefly the overwhelming force applied to the Gaza Strip by the Israeli armed forces. And the 1983 U.S. Marines barracks bombing carried out by the cover group "The Free Islamic Revolutionary Movement," resulted in the deaths of 241 U.S. troops (It should be noted that at this time the U.S. had effectively sided with the Maronite coalition against the Shia' in the Lebanese Sectarian Civil War). The immediate result of this attack was the removal by the late President Reagan of U.S. Marines from Lebanese soil the following year. What were the costs to Hizballah from that attack? A single bomber's life, the name of which is to this day unknown. The truck and explosives cost the organization roughtly $1,500-$2,000. Hizballah had discovered a strategy that allowed them to even the odds with Israel and the U.S.

     This is not an attempt to either excuse the targeting of innocent civilians or accept the premise that resistance movements and dialogue are mutually exclusive options. Moreover, I suspect a majority of Hizballah and Hamas leaders share a similar distaste for plain murder and uncompromising militancy as well. Full disclosure: These groups have been guilty of atrocious acts of unwarranted violence. And yet, it's surprising why the West tries to differentiate between war writ large, and the atrocities perpetrated during war. War, for all intents and purposes, is the effort to extinguish life, and it is therefore expected that enemy combatants will err on the side of caution at the regrettable expense of acting immorally. Similar to the passage of time, Death waits for no man.

     Hizballah and Hamas either have been or currently are engaged in outright war with the West. It is telling, however that these groups have insisted upon operating within political frameworks, however imperfect the results. Neither these groups nor their benefactor, Iran, espouse the hatred typical of al-Qaeda. The former use militancy as a means to a political end, and grandstand to garner popular support (al-Qaeda's actions are not so subtle). Our forefathers did very much the same, and resistance movements will do the same not so much if they are able, but when they have no other choice.

     Those who insist that Hizballah lay down their weapons forget why they picked them up in the first place in 1982. And to lament Hamas' unwillingness to renounce violence as a precondition for negotiations with Israel and the U.S. is tantamount to laying the blame at the feet of David if he were to refuse the entreaties of moderates for him to lay down his sling before 'negotiating' with Goliath. "What am I to do," he would respond, "if a peaceful accord should prove allusive? Where then should I find safety if not from my sling?!" That 'moderate' precondition, however genuine, exposed him to the giant's sudden wrath the moment dialogue broke down.

     We must eradicate all forms of the word "Terrorism" from our political discussions. Each and every one of its forms are poisonous. Asymmetry is a far more appropriate substitute that at once conveys a useful description of reality while moderating the discussion so that an honest appraisal of contentious politics can take place. Asymmetry is an admission of weakness by a group with real political claims as they are confronted with an asymmetrical balance of conventional forces.

Politics, not Reality, Drives U.S. Foreign Policy vis a v. the Islamic Republic

The Collapse of 38 Studios and the Likely Fallout for Rhode Island Raise Serious Constitutional Questions

WISHFUL THINKING

In terms of the value of public funds squandered, and the political fall-out from a succession of poor decisions, the 38 Studios bond issuance debacle which was proposed, approved, and funded by both the State of Rhode Island and the quasi-public Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation (hereafter, RIEDC), is a miraculous case study in public mismanagement. Within two years -- a relatively short amount of time in the equity market -- former Boston Red Sox pitcher Curt Shilling's gaming software enterprise failed in spectacular fashion. Unable to convince a single venture capital firm from the Boston area to invest in his company, out of roughly 200 firms, Shilling looked to the red-headed step-child of New England, Rhode Island, for support. In quick succession, a series of decisions were made at the highest levels of the Rhode Island executive and legislative branches, and allowed by omission by the judicial branch, that culminated in an unprecedented bond issuance to fund a loan package equal in value to $75 million to a singular project: 38 Studios' proposal to develop and release two video games, predicted by Shilling to generate a stream of profits equal to the success Bill Gates achieved with Microsoft. 

Two years after that process began in 2010, 38 Studios filed for bankruptcy. Governor Lincoln Chafee is arguing today that the State of Rhode Island, while not legally obligated to do so, should nonetheless guarantee the outstanding debt owed to private bondholders by the RIEDC. This in spite of the fact that the RIEDC is an entity, "legally distinct" from the state of Rhode Island the latter of which granted the RIEDC its authority.

CREDIT RISK

Current debate is centered around the competing camps of pragmatism and idealism, two motivating ideologies that offer mutually exclusive scenarios both likely to punish Rhode Island taxpayers. Chafee, an emphatic critic of 38's plan from the beginning, is convinced that Rhode Island's borrowing costs would soar if RIEDC's outstanding debt owed is not paid to investors. And he's right to be worried, but his argument in favor of guaranteeing RIEDC's debt has failed to address a glaring constitutional dilemma: Rhode Island's constitution, specifically Article VI, Section 16, clearly prohibits the state from, "[pledging] the faith of the state for the payment of the obligations of others," in this case RIEDC. Moreover, the very creation of the RIEDC, and the legal authority given to that entity to fund capital programs through the issuance of bonds to private investors is unconstitutional.

The threat of a credit downgrade and the ensuing difficulty the state will experience when trying to access credit markets should have both been judged as unacceptable risks. The state is required to receive public support via a popular referendum if bonds are to be issued to raise capital. Why wouldn't the RIEDC need to garner public support for its bond issuance? If the investment package for 38 Studios' proposal could not be guaranteed to succeed -- which was impossible -- then the State of Rhode Island was saddled with a de facto liability all along. Because the state and RIEDC were considered separate legal entities, as per authorizing legislation, then the RIEDC would have to prove that the state was never in danger of a credit downgrade if 38 Studios filed for bankruptcy. Anything short of that proof would mean that the state would have to either pay for the debt obligations of the RIEDC in order to maintain credit worthiness, or, refusing to pay those obligations, would be subject to higher interest rates in the capital markets. Both of these scenarios violate the Rhode Island constitution.

A SHADOWY ORGANIZATION      

The existence of the RIEDC and its structure, while not necessarily unconstitutional, is undemocratic. The RIEDC's executive body, the Board of Directors, is composed of only 13 members. The ex officio chairman of the board is, surprisingly, also the current Rhode Island Governor, and he requests 11 more appointments for the board's membership to be evaluated and approved by the R.I. General Assembly. The entire process of staffing the RIEDC is overseen by public officials. This structure is troublesome because of the influence current public officials have over the corporation's powers. Even though the chairman can not vote, I would argue that to allow the state's chief executive to also serve as the chairman of a legal entity created by the state is unethical.

The U.S. Constitution explicitly prohibits Congressional members from serving in other offices of the U.S. upon entry into the legislature. "No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time [sic] for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States... and no Person holding Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office" (Article I, Section 6.) This is not to suggest that state constitutions should mirror the U.S. Constitution. Rather, the Framers recognized the inherent danger of allowing public officials to occupy multiple offices. One officer enjoying the authority of multiple offices is contradicts the importance of a separation of powers between and among the separate branches of government, and the efficacy of a system of checks and balances.

"LET THEM EAT CAKE!"

The very creation of the RIEDC as a separate legal entity from the state was not only unnecessary, but, it could be argued, was an effort to bypass the referendum process required whenever the state sought to issue bonds or notes in excess of $50,000. The Department of Economic Development was already in existence when the RIEDC was created. Why create a second entity to fulfill the same purposes as an established state department? The answer can be found in R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-64-7.5., "Transfer of functions from the Department of Economic Development." Subsection (a) reads, "All functions formerly administered by the department of economic development are hereby transferred to the Rhode Island economic development corporation." 

In addition to the functions transferred from the state department to RIEDC, the new entity was granted an exemption from seeking public approval for raising debt through referendums. The bonds and notes the RIEDC issues do not require approval from the public, whereas those of the Department of Economic Development had to satisfy that requirement. So, strictly stating the facts: in one move, the state eliminated the need to consult the public when seeking to risk their tax dollars, and vested that authority to issue debt instruments with a new entity answerable only to the 12 voting members of the Board of Directors.

Moreover, only five members of the Board of Directors are needed for a quorum. And only a simple majority of the Directors present at the consideration of business is sufficient to approve loans and the issuance of bonds to fund those loans. In other words, while the State of Rhode Island can not issue debt without the consent of the public via popular referendum, the RIEDC is so constructed that three people can issue debt to private investors with no need to consult the public. This would be of little concern to us if the State of Rhode Island had no fiduciary responsibilities to the RIEDC. But as is abundantly clear from recent developments, the health of Rhode Island finances is inextricably linked to the RIEDC.

A PIPELINE FOR REALLOCATIONS 

The RIEDC could not operate without direct support from the Rhode Island General Assembly. Specifically, the Rhode Island General Assembly provides annual appropriations to the RIEDC. These appropriations are used by the RIEDC to fund, inter alia, debt obligations. How is that constitutional? The money Rhode Island gives to the RIEDC is spent on RIEDC's obligations. Article VI, Section 16 of the Rhode Island Constitution prohibits this type of support: "The General Assembly shall have no powers, without the express consent of the people, to incur state debts to an amount exceeding fifty thousand dollars, except in time of war [sic]... nor shall it in any case, without such consent, pledge the faith of the state for the payment of the obligations of others."

However, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-64-8.1., "Appropriation and expenses," simply disregards this constitutional prohibition. It says, "The general assembly shall annually appropriate any sums that it may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter; and the state controller is authorized and directed to draw his or her orders upon the general treasurer for the payment of that sum, or so much as may be required from time to time, upon receipt by the controller of proper vouchers authenticated." The constitution and this law contradict one another, but things get more weird.

Article VI, Section 17 of the constitution allows the state to borrow money when it anticipates fund receipts to be forthcoming from multiple sources. This would seem to invalidate my argument because this section seems to allow the state to borrow money, and transfer it to separate entities -- in this case the RIEDC -- so long as future receipts are expected. I'm simplifying the text, but that's the gist of the clause. There's a major flaw in that clause, however: receipts will always be expected from debtors up until the moment when they file for bankruptcy. 38 Studios was scheduled to repay the RIEDC directly, and the State of Rhode Island indirectly, up until May of 2012 when the company filed for bankruptcy. Both the RIEDC and the state had credited their accounts with the expected receipts from 38 Studios as if these were guaranteed. When 38 Studios defaulted, those receipts vanished and the RIEDC and state were in an awkward position where debt obligations owed by the RIEDC to private investors was no longer supported by future expected funds. In one fell swoop, Section 17 was invalidated, and Section 16 then dominated all constitutional considerations, if it wasn't supreme before.

A FAIT ACCOMPLI 

The support provided to the RIEDC by the State of Rhode Island, while not legally obligatory, can be considered a de facto obligation for the state. This fact is exposed in detail within R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-62, The Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation Act:

"[Let it be] Resolved, that in order [to] assure any payments due on guarantees or bond obligations issued by the corporation in connection with the program pursuant to this authorization are made, to assure the continued operation and solvency of the corporation for the carrying out of its corporate purposes, and except as otherwise set forth in these authorizing resolutions in accordance with the provisions of chapter 64, title 42 of the [R.I.] general laws: (i) The cooperation shall create a reserve fund from which shall be charged any and all expenses of the corporation with respect to guarantee or bond obligations of the corporation pursuant to these resolutions resulting from a program borrower's default; and (ii) The corporation shall credit to the reserve funds no less than fifty percent (50%) of all program receipts of the corporation including guaranty fees, premiums and any other receipts or recoveries from collections received pursuant to the corporation's rights to recover payments as a guarantor; and (iii) To the extent the corporation's obligations as a guarantor or pursuant to its program bond obligations are not satisfied by amounts in its guaranty reserve fund, the executive director of the corporation shall annually, on or before December 1st, make a delivery to the [R.I.] governor a certificate stating the minimum amount, if any, required for the corporation to make payments due on such guarantees. During each January session of the general assembly, the governor shall submit to the general assembly, as part of the governor's budget, the total such sums, if any, required to pay any and all obligations of the corporation under such guarantees or bond obligations pursuant to the terms of this authorization. All sums appropriated by the general assembly for that purpose, and paid to the corporation, if any, shall be utilized by the corporation to make payments due on such guarantees or bond obligations."

So if the RIEDC is not able to maintain a balance in its reserve fund equal to 

or greater than 50% of its total outstanding obligations, then there are only a 

few funding options available to the corporation to boost its capital 

requirements. Annual financial audits of the RIEDC's balance sheets reveal its 

consistent reliance upon appropriations from the R.I. General Assembly to meet 

its reserve fund requirements. The law is explicit: "All sums appropriated by the 

general assembly for that purpose [to pay any and all obligations of the 

corporation required by bond issuance agreements between RIEDC and bond program 

borrowers], and paid to the corporation, if any, shall be utilized by the 

corporation to make payments due on such guarantees or bond obligations." That is 

a mind-blowing stipulation. Consider, again, this specific clause of Article VI, 

Section 16 from the Rhode Island Constitution: "The General Assembly shall have 

no powers, without the express consent of the people... [to] pledge the faith of 

the state for the payment of the obligations of others." Constitutions always 

supersede legislation and if the latter violates the former, then it is the job 

of the judicial branch to invalidate that legislation.

THE STATE CONSTITUTION

Even if one were to argue that the State of Rhode Island is only required to honor its "moral authority" to guarantee the debt of a quasi-public entity like the RIEDC, Section 16 still prohibits "The General Assembly [from incurring] state debts... exceeding fifty thousand dollars," without the express consent of the people through a popular referendum. No, appropriations are not legally defined as debts; they are voluntary transfers of public funds. But that is a moot point, and here's the crucial insight that explains why that is the case: The purpose of these appropriations, as mentioned above, is to directly assist the RIEDC's efforts to maintain a reserve fund balance equal to, or in excess of, 50% of its outstanding bond receivables, or amount owed to the RIEDC. In other words, R.I. General Assembly appropriations given to the RIEDC are used for obligations that should have been subject to a public referendum before any appropriations were considered.

That requirement was bypassed recently during the Studios 38 fiasco, but many times before that incident as well. In fact, RIEDC's combined statement of net assets as of June 30, 2012 lists the total "Bonds payable" and "Loans payable" sub-categories as equal to $360,982,523. Again, the State is likely to exercise its "moral authority" to guarantee the bond payments are made to bondholders from the Studios 38 deal in order to protect Rhode Island's access to affordable credit. This guarantee is called a "Conduit Debt Transaction," and these transactions are the lifeblood of the RIEDC. To wit, "The total aggregate principal amount outstanding under all conduit debt obligations at June 30, 2012 was approximately $1,063,000,000" ("Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation: Financial Statements and Supplementary Information Year Ended June 30, 2012," (22 October 2012,) 37, Braver PC Accountants & Advisors.) Yes, that number is correct: billions. 

When officials, like Governor Chafee, claim that the State of Rhode Island is not technically liable for RIEDC's obligations, they are only correct in an abstract, legalistic sense. The consequences Rhode Island will experience if it doesn't guarantee RIEDC's debts would be devastating. The very threat of this occurring is the catalyst for the emergence of our constitutional dilemma. Access to capital in the private equity market would immediately vanish, or rather, would only be offered to the State at exorbitantly high interest rates. But why is that the case? After all, the authorizing law which created the RIEDC made it explicitly clear that the RIEDC was henceforth considered a "legal entity separate from the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations." That clause is a hollow one, however.

There is a slim chance that taxpayers will avoid either directly or indirectly paying for the RIEDC's obligations. If the legislature approves Chafee's idea to guarantee the corporation's liabilities, then the taxpayers will be asked to directly pay. If the state refuses to honor the bondholder's rights, and the equity and financial investment markets restrict the state's access to, or increase the cost of, financing, then a few negative effects could happen: higher interest rates would demand that a larger portion of the state's budget be set aside to pay those costs, thereby forcing the state to either cut services or raise taxes. The only other way to offset higher borrowing costs without cutting services or demanding higher taxes is to magically generate new economic growth with some concoction of "voodoo economics." The first two possibilities are unsavory and highly probable; the latter, an unlikelihood approaching wishful thinking.

HISTORICAL LESSONS & CHAFEE'S CHOICE OF THE LESSER EVIL

The propensity of capital markets to punish bond issuers has repeatedly occurred in recent history. A global example will illustrate this point. 

As was painfully shown during the 1980's throughout the Latin American community of emerging markets -- notably Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico -- equity and debt markets are just as likely, if not more likely, to be guided by psychological factors than they are by logical ones. In essence, as these states individually enjoyed access to affordable capital, provided by private investment firms, they progressively exposed themselves to more risk that slowly built up within their group. Seeking to feed their industrialization policies, these states quickly expanded the amount of debt on their balance sheets. Loans were denominated primarily in dollars but then lent to domestic borrowers in the national currencies. For a while this wasn't a problem because Latin America enjoyed a favorable exchange-rate balance between the national currencies of its member states and the U.S. dollar. However, that quickly changed following a cascading sequence of events that made it nearly impossible for these states to maintain fiscal credibility in the debt markets.

When the U.S. supported Israel in its struggle against the Arab world during the Yom Kippur War, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) responded in turn by simultaneously restricting the supply of oil to the global market and raising prices. This triggered immediate inflation in the developed world, most notably in the United States. Paul Volker, the chairman of the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors, acted to combat this inflation in the early 1980's by raising the federal funds rate to 20.1%, while the Treasury Department sold bonds and notes to soak up cash in the economy. These efforts induced a recession, but popped the inflationary bubble. 

Unfortunately, these medicines crippled Latin America's ability to finance its debt. Faced with a dramatically unfavorable exchange-rate, these states struggled to collect enough of their national currencies to exchange for dollars which were now more expensive. They exhausted their capital reserves and soon exposed their financial weaknesses to the world. Mexico defaulted first, but in so doing doomed the other emerging economies as well because, as the markets reasoned, individual circumstances of each state were overshadowed by the group's collective risk. And so access to capital vanished, defaults ensued, and economic and social pain gripped these societies. 

Similarly, the market won't distinguish between the State of Rhode Island and the RIEDC. The creditworthiness of each is seen as an inseparable whole. Moreover, at the institutional level the RIEDC is composed of R.I. public officials from the highest levels of government. The Governor sits on the corporation's Board of Governors and recommends eleven candidates for approval by the Rhode Island General Assembly to sit on the Board as well. What has happened since the RIEDC's creation is the selection of prominent business leaders within Rhode Island who almost invariably support the same policies that the State of Rhode Island currently supports. This duplicitous support is by nature both political and financial, wherein lies the danger.

Public officials do not have the luxury to hedge their bets as financial investors do, for to do so would be interpreted by the public as a public violation of ethical standards. The result is the expectation of financial institutions that poor mismanagement of either the state's finances, or those of the RIEDC, guarantees that the other is more than likely being mismanaged as well. Taken to an extreme conclusion, some analysts within the credit market would see the close relations between the state and RIEDC as indicative of corruption and, therefore, a highly risky credit option. 

The State of Rhode Island tried to create a quasi-public authority, providing it with the benefits available to these entities, while naively suggesting that the new corporation, and the State, were insulated from one another's risk. The legislators didn't realize that markets are rarely controlled by legal nuances. Credit rating analysts see the cross-over between the members of these two political bodies, and the murky, commingled flow of operating funds, and rightly conclude that, in spite of legislation, no de facto legal separation exists between the state and the corporation.

That is why Governor Chaffee is making the case that, while he doesn't agree with the state's options implied by reality, he must nonetheless ask the Rhode Island taxpayers to guarantee the obligations of the RIEDC. The public enjoyed neither the opportunity to evaluate the 38 Studios bond issuance nor the constitutional right to vote using that evaluation to inform their decision. But nonetheless, market realities will leave this 'dead-cat' on the door-steps of each and every taxpayer, whether they like it or not.         

U.S. Increases Aid to Syrian Rebels

U.S. doubles 'non-lethal'(Al Jazeera) aid to Syrian rebels in the form of 'battle-field support equipment.' Disregarding the semantic nonsense, this policy suffers from indecisiveness. Secretary of State John Kerry said, "Our first choice as a resolution to this crisis is a political one." Silly Kerry! Did you not read von Calusewitz? "War is merely the continuation of politics by other means." Either we want Bashar gone, or we don't.

The Historical Phenomenon of Decisive Battles Part I: Themistocles and the Battle of Salamis

Students of history will agree that the study of ancient warfare is arguably the most intriguing era for consideration. Whether one looks at the citizen armies of the Greek city-states like Athens and Sparta; the conscripted masses of the Persian empire; or a blend of the two, characteristic of both Republican and Imperial Rome, one can not help but marvel at the sheer magnitude and force of these armies and the resources they demanded. The historians of old -- Herodotus, Thucydides, Livy, Polybius, and Tactitus, to name a few -- wrote entire chapters on the efforts required to raise, equip, train, and supply these juggernauts. A full Roman legion from the Imperial era numbered roughly 5,500 men at arms, for instance, with a mix of infantry and cavalry, the former making up the lion's share of combatants. A full Consular Roman army was massive: numbering roughly 20,000 men.

These bodies of troop were incredibly expensive, cumbersome, and required a massive supply of food and equipment for the entirety of their campaigns which often lasted years. Hannibal's invasion of the Italian peninsula in 218 B.C. lasted fifteen years. To command an army of either ancient Greece, Rome, or Persia was the highest honor for an individual. To succeed in battle was to guarantee one's place in the annals of heroes and legends to be cherished for generations. To lose, on the other hand, could mean death in the worst case scenario, or a lifetime of shame for the losing general and his progeny at best. Confronted with these two extremes, it is no wonder that planned, pitched battles between two fully deployed armies were rare. It is against this tendency that we must consider the choices of generals to gamble everything upon major, decisive battles aimed at the complete annihilation of their enemy's forces.

Bust of Themistocles

We begin with the decisive battle at Salamis between the Greek city-state alliance, led by Athens and Sparta, more or less commanded by the half-Athenian statesman, Themistocles, and the Persian empire, commanded by Xerxes. 

The Persian emperor Darius crushed the Ionian Revolt in 493 B.C., and then swore an oath to punish the Athenians who had supported the revolt. Herodotus tells us that one of Darius' slaves had the peculiar task of  whispering into the emperor's ear, "Sire, remember the Athenians," every single night at dinner. The Lord of Persia is said to have fumed each and every time he heard these words. The hatred Darius felt for the intransigent Athenians was to shake the foundations of the Greek and Aegean civilizations for generations to come.

One man in particular, Themistocles, himself only half Athenian, was to shepherd his fellow citizens during their darkest hours and achieve one of the greatest military victories in history. His brilliant long-term strategy secured for Athens a fighting chance when their hour of doom was upon them, but it was his insistence for, and command of, the Battle of Salamis in 480 B.C. that would be the pinnacle of his remarkable career.

First, we must travel back to 490 B.C. Darius invaded Greece with roughly 35,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and a fleet of transport and supply ships. The Persian army landed at the Bay of Marathon where the 10,000 Athenians and 1,000 Plataens, under the generalship of the Athenian, Miltiades, were waiting for them. The battle that ensued began as a clear mismatch in favor of the more numerous Persian army, but ended with a stunning Greek victory thanks the the decisive battle plan that Miltiades was able to perform.

With the Persians defeated and gone, the Greeks reveled in their victory, knowing full well that they had snatched their freedom from the jaws of a tyrannical host. In Athens, most of the citizens considered the Persian menace to no longer pose a threat. One man, Themistocles, knew instinctively however that the Persians would be back in the near future seeking retribution. Any emperor would seek revenge for the loss suffered at Marathon for both practical and symbolic reasons. For Darius, revenge would not prove attainable, as he died before he could invade again. The imperial mantle fell to his son, Xerxes, instead.

Prior to the Persian invasion of Greece in 481/0 B.C., the Athenians struck an unusually large vein of silver at their colonial mining city of Laurium in 483 B.C. This instance of good fortune provided Themistocles with a rare opportunity to apply his skill as a statesman. Like a joint-stock venture, the Athenian assembly was on the verge of voting to share the new silver wealth proportionally between all of the city-state's citizens. Themistocles, on the other hand, knew that however honorable such a plan might be, it would be a missed opportunity for Athens to protect herself from the future Persian menace. To seize such an opportunity, and to protect his city, Themistocles wanted to build a massive Athenian navy of combat triremes. Keep in mind, again, that most Athenians did not think another Persian invasion of mainland Greece to be an imminent threat, so Themistocles needed to find a more persuasive image to support his argument. The answer? Aegina. This island city-state was located south-west of the Athenian port of Piraeus and the two cities were perpetual enemies. In fact, at the time of this debate concerning the silver wealth, Athens and Aegina were locked in a simmering feud. So Themistocles linked together his goal of building a massive navy with the threat of Aegina's likely harassment of Athenian trade and blockade of merchant shipping lanes.

The Athenian Assembly agreed and within two years' time, Themistocles' navy of roughly 200 triremes was built. The timing of his achievement could not have been better. As of spring 480 B.C. Xerxes has amassed a land invasion force of roughly 250,000-300,000 men and 1,200 ships, the bulk of which were offensive, naval warfare ships. This entire invasion force -- the largest in history until the allied invasion of Nazi occupied Normandy on 6 June 1944 -- was bent on the destruction of Greek civilization, and subjugation of its people. 

Xerxes crossed the Hellespont, swept down through Thessaly, defeated and conquered the ancient, religious city-state of Thebes, and brought the defeated remnants of that proud city over to the Persian cause. After Thessaly and the Theban defeat, Xerxes won two major battles, one on land and one at sea, at the simultaneous battles of Thermopylae and Artemesium. With no military answer to this invasion force capable of meeting Xerxes in battle, the Greek world north of the Peloponnese no longer existed. Themistocles had convinced the Athenians to desert their city at this time or face the wrath of the Persians. Xerxes marched into Attica (the countryside of Athens), devastated the crops and farmland, and finally marched through the gates of the now uninhabited city-state of Athens. The Persians killed anyone who remained and burnt the Acropolis to the ground. 

Persian land and naval invasion routes 481-0 B.C.

Preceding this event, Themistocles had convinced his countrymen to evacuate the city, noting to the distraught Athenians that a city can -- and in this case, must -- live on in the people, not the physical walls or buildings that they once called Athens. Some people said, "Why don't we march out and meet the Persians on the battlefield? We won a decade ago at Marathon." Themistocles answered that they would be facing a quarter of a million Persians, not the 35,000 from a decade ago, and the Greeks would be wiped out. "Why don't we barricade ourselves within the city walls of Athens?" some asked. Themistocles answered that they would be cut off from re-supply from the sea and land as a land force of 250,000 men and 1,200 triremes could easily encircle Athens and her port of Piraeus. The other Greek leaders wanted to build a defensive wall across the Corinthian isthmus and fortify the Peloponnese with what remaining land and naval forces they had. Themistocles warned them that the Persians would simply sail around the Peloponnese and push through the Saronic gulf, thus bypassing the defensive wall and overwhelming any naval presence the Greeks could muster. Most importantly, Themistocles stressed that the last plan was impractical because there were no ports sufficiently protected enough to allow for such a passive strategy to succeed. Themistocles reasoned that only a purely offensive, naval battle would free the Greeks from their present danger. And this is how Themistocles convinced the Hellenes to fight a decisive battle at the island of Salamis, within the narrow straits between the rocky shores. 










(Left) Battle dispositions and maneuvers of Greeks and Persians at Salamis; (Above) Satellite image of Salamis and narrow straits where battle was fought. 



After convincing the Greeks to fight this battle, Themistocles used a bit of disinformation to likewise bring Xerxes to battle as well. He sent a messenger up to the great Persian king, the messenger obviously posing as a traitor seeking safety and reward. Keep in mind that Xerxes had won at Thermopylae in large part due to the traitorous Greek counsel of Ephialtes who had shown a secret goat path to the Persians which wound behind the Spartan and Greek force blocking the pass. It is no wonder that Xerxes, when presented with another tip for defeating the Greeks, this time absolutely, he jumped at the opportunity without question. The double-agent of Themistocles told Xerxes that the time to strike the Greek navy was at hand and that the Persian king must act decisively before the Greeks sail away to Sicily or some other colonial outpost. 

Facing a Persian fleet of roughly 1,100-1,200 triremes, Themistocles arrayed the combined Greek naval forces in a short, compact line of triremes perpendicular to the incoming Persian fleet. Xerxes pushed his main body of ships into the strait while swinging a smaller detachment of Egyptian ships around the island to block any retreat by the Greeks. The Corinthian section of the Greek navy was to hold off this back-door menace while the main body, commanded by Themistocles, was to spring its trap upon the cumbersome and numerous Persian body. The Greek ships were larger and more unwieldy than the fast Persian ships, but it was the large brass rams on the front of the Greek ships that gave Themistocles a definitive advantage in the narrow straits. As soon as Xerxes fleet entered the narrow body of water, they were struck from the flank by the Greek triremes. Unable to maneuver, the Persian fleet was decimated. As the front line of Persian ships was caught off guard, they tried to back water and retreat but instead fouled their oars with those ships of the second and third lines. To make matters worse, a wedge of Greek ships split the entire Persian fleet in two as it cleaved its way through the now immobile Persian force. 

Numbers are sketchy, but most historians agree that around 250-300 Persian ships sank that day and no less than 70,000-80,000 Persian sailors and marines lost their lives. This was to be the worst naval defeat in European and Mediterranean affairs, even more devastating than the Ottoman defeat at the battle of Lepanto in 1571.  

The defeat at Salamis crippled Xerxes' invasion force. No longer able to guarantee his supply train for his army, Xerxes took the main portion of the invasion force and returned to Persia with the remainder of his fleet. He left a large force of infantry behind under the command of Mardonius to fight the Greeks, and the following summer in 479 B.C., such a battle took place on the plains of Platea. A large force of Greek city-states marched together out of the Peloponnese and met the Persian army which had been cut off from its lines of supply and communication, and had grown tired of conquest. The Greek hoplites won a decisive victory and, for all intents and purposes, the Persian menace would not threaten the Greek world for another sixty years. Even then, the Persians were invited by the Spartans and the Peloponnesian League to help defeat the Athenian empire at the tail end of the devastating Great Peloponnesian War. 

For our consideration, we must look to Themistocles as a statesman of singular vision and decisiveness. His ability to convince his countrymen to evacuate their city in exchange for the open seas and an uncertain future, and his successful persuasion of the Hellenic alliance to fight one decisive battle at Salamis, against all odds, were two of history's more remarkable diplomatic achievements. His cool-headed plan of attack within the narrow straits at Salamis, and his subsequent command of the ensuing battle, were a testament to his superb generalship. More than any other consideration, his confident choice to fight a decisive battle at Salamis is most impressive. There is no doubt that to lose at Salamis would have meant certain death and subjugation for the entire Greek civilization from that day forth. Judging a decisive battle to be a reasonable alternative to flight is the most remarkable achievement Themistocles has on his record of stunning accolades. And that is why he serves as our first of three installments of history's most noteworthy victories at decisive battles.

Next time, we look at the three successive victories of the Carthaginian General, Hannibal Barca:the River Ticinus, Lake Trasimene, and the glorious battle of Cannae. These victories took place during the early years of Hannibal's fifteen-year invasion of the Roman republic. 

Please Wait for the Facts to Emerge

Kingston, RI, 11:30 PM: Boston Police Commissioner, Ed Davis, has said there are no suspects in custody at this time, contary to rumors that a Saudi naitonal has been apprehended. And while the White House has labeled this incident an 'act of terror', FBI investigator Richard DesLauriers used more measured language saying, "it [the attack] is a criminal investigations that is a potential terrorist investigation." 

Please wait for the facts to emerge before hysteria informas your anti-Islamic anger. Information shared with the public thus far is not consistent with an 'act of terror', as the U.S. public understands that phrase. A 13-second delay between the two explosions, located hundreds of feed down the road from one another, indicates a time-triggered device, neither a suicide attack nor a remotely controlled explosion. Two unexploded devices were found farther up Boylston stree, and were subsequently disarmed. That's a 50% success rate. 

The explosions erupted three hours after the Marathon's winner had crossed the finished line; the winner's crossing of the finish line being the window of highest televised publicity. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack, contrary to the usual practice of foreign terrorist organizations, except for the Iranians. The devices were pipe bombs and used a small number of ball-bearing objects as shrapnel, again, an inconsistentcy with past terrorist attacks. 

Next press conference is tomorrow morning at 9:30 AM