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Wednesday, May 1, 2013

A non-Apologetic Appraisal of Hizballah, Hamas, and Political Islam


     If there's any lesson to be drawn from the Boston Marathon bombings it is that Americans will grab for any answer to the dilemma of militant extremism which is neither Islamic nor political by nature. To conjure the specter of "terrorism' - an image clear to the U.S. and Western publics - is to choose the path of least resistance. Terrorism, viewed as a militant corruption of political activism, serves as a convenient, albeit misguided, coping mechanism. Do not misinterpret my intention this early in the post: al-Qaeda perpetrated a heinous act of cold-blooded murder on 9/11, and the Tsaranev brothers are guilty of a similar offense. If I had my chance to exact revenge on bin-Laden (UBL), I'd tell him the same thing Marcellus Wallace told "Zed" he was about to do in Quentin Tarantino's "Pulp Fiction": "I'm gonna' get medieval on your ass!" But after exhausting my efforts of putting UBL through the gauntlet, I suspect a cold feeling of discomfort would continue unabated so long as chaos and uncertainty threatened to disrupt my life.

     It wasn't surprising that most U.S. news agencies speculated that the Boston bombers established connections with the Chechen separatist movement of southern Russia. That speculation was expected and is typical of our media institutions, led by individuals unworthy of Walter Cronkite, David Halberstam, and other paragons of honest journalism. What surprised me was the instantaneous public reaction to this speculation: if it's on T.V. it must be true. Never mind the Tsaranev's upbringing in central Asia's Kyrgyzstan, a state as difficult to locate on a map as is its name is to pronounce (10 street credit points to those who know its capital city!). And let us disregard the fact that the Chechen separatist movement - notwithstanding a particularly horrific episode where hundreds of Russian schoolchildren were murdered in cold blood - has one of the more legitimate claims for independence amongst the spectrum of resistance movements throughout the world. No, these considerations and many more were overridden by the public's need to establish connections, assign blame, in anticipation of the eventual military response against an identified threat which - unsurprisingly - was motivated by that same vein of Salafiyyah militant Islam characteristic of al-Qaeda (not the Taliban: the Taliban's ideology, the Deobandi school of thought, grew out of an Indian sect of missionary Islam (al-dawah) based in the Muslim enclave of Deoband).

     Alas, unless George W. abrogates the Constitution by winning the Presidency once more, it is unlikely that the U.S. public will swallow another pile of bull-shit ala Iraqi WMDs. No, the conclusion to the Boston attack will be more anti-climatic than the public realizes. Ironically, this letdown is the very reason why the public will not rest easy: a ruthless attack perpetrated by 'lone-wolf' outcasts who were motivated by anger and a desire to hurt innocents is more destabilizing than an orchestrated attack. In the meantime, we'll blame political Islam and the phenomenon of Islamic Terrorism.

     By doing so we will stay mired in what George Friedman calls the "Terror Trap" in his book The Next Decade: Empire and Republic in a Changing World (2012). The trap was sprung when the U.S. launched its "War on Terror." How does one defeat terrorism? Rather, how does one defeat a battlefield tactic? It's as if the British sought to defeat the act of 'sniping' carried out by militia sharpshooters during the U.S. Revolutionary War of Independence. To win, the British would have to kill or capture every single person capable of becoming a sniper! Impossible. And what do we make of the D.C. sniper attacks in 2002? The greater D.C. area was gripped with fear as John Allen Muhammad and his younger accomplice Lee Boyd Malvo roamed Interstate 95 in Virgina eventually killing 10 random civilians. After arrested, however, Muhammad and Malvo were tried in Virginia state court for murder instead of terrorism despite all indications that acts of 'Terror,' as we understand the term, were perpetrated. As for the Tsaranev brothers' attack in Boston recently, President Obama tried to indirectly moderate the national discussion through his reluctance to label the attack an "Act of Terror,' and for good reason. In the face of political pressure though, a White House aide quickly placated the American public by confirming, in fact, that the attack was an act of terror because "Whenever multiple bombs are used, it is an act of terror" (paraphrase). Wait a minute? Isn't terrorism the act of instilling fear in the public in order to, inter alia, achieve political goals? So how or why did the Obama administration think it legitimate to label this an act of terror before the perpetrators were arrested and before their motives were known? The truth is is that we've latched on to terrorists as a familiar enemy just like we did during the Cold War; Communism was then the monolithic creature haunting our dreams at night. Better to be haunted by a known enemy than a unknown one, or so the logic demands.

     We have now exposed the truest cause of our need to apply a catch-all phrase, Terrorism, to a infinitely complex array of chaotic forces. The issue is more fundamental than a strategic imperative. Terrorists of today stand in stark moral contrast to extremists from the past. Sure, al-Qaeda and global jihadi groups seek neither political representation nor accommodation. There's is a struggle between civilizations. But what of Hizballah and Hamas? the Shia' resistance movement based in southern Lebanon and the Palestinian terrorist organization pursuing 'self-determination' as a political end by employing military and political means, respectively. Both of these groups are guilty of murder, but murder is not their modus operandi; grassroots political activism is. In fact, they've relied consistently upon political institutions more than missionary or jihadi alternatives. Contrary to secular practice, religion and politics are not mutually exclusive options, and in the case of Islam the two are inextricably linked. Unlike Christianity, the birth of Islam developed in lock-step with a correspondingly successful military campaign that swept through the Arabian Peninsula and across North Africa. The result of that dichotomous relationship between church and state legitimacy was an unimpeded infusion of Islamic ideals into the state apparatus. Social norms and state institutions were built upon Islamic foundations. Christians, on the other hand, were suppressed by the Roman Empire and forced to obey pagan institutions that honored Caesar as God. The one true irony of Western liberal democracy is that its institutions were borne from weakness not an inherent strength that the Muslim Umma lacked.

     How do we categorize the anarchist movements of the nineteenth century? Is it not a mark of progress today that laborers enjoy safe work conditions and reasonable five-day work weeks? Whence did these rights come from? Answer: from the collective strike, the hidden gun, and well-timed bomb. British suffragettes used extreme measures to achieve political ends. "They broke windows, planted bombs, and hurled Molotov cocktails through the windows of politicians' homes, public buildings, and shops" (Norton, On the Muslim Question, 2013, p. 83 ). Their successful efforts informed today's constitutions of the UK, France, and the United States. Women's' right to vote and access to equal pay in the workplace "were, as Nietzsche said of all great things, 'soaked in blood thoroughly, and for a long time' " (Ibid, 85).

     Likewise, the nascent independence movement of the U.S. colonies finally broke free from British suzerainty, not through political machinations, but in spite of them. Only a military struggle achieved what parliamentary democracy could not. Similar to today's resistance movements in Palestine and the Levant, General Washington's regular army and supplement of rag-tag militias refused to lay down their arms as "a precondition for negotiations." It is therefore puzzling that the West so easily labels Hizballah and Hamas as evil forces on the one hand, while romanticizing the exploits of colonial militias on the other.

     We forget to interpret our struggle for independence as an historical precursor to Islamic resistance movements. Our struggle for independence was not a random disruption in our minds, but an explosive reaction to long-simmering forces. Then again, we framed the issue. Because we were actors in that continental drama, the randomness of events and the violent overthrow of the colonial status quo were validations of our political aims. British fear, panic, and unease were the corollaries to our frustration with political servitude, an apathetic crown, and the eventual decision to work outside of British institutions that neither addressed nor respected colonial grievances. These were the reasons the colonies employed militant tactics; tactics considered then by the British and the U.S. today as anathema to liberal democratic institutions.

     Our militant independence movement manifest itself only after non-violent, political petitions for representation were rebuffed. Petitions for a redress from grievances were exhausted. Independence was achieved, but not without a great loss of life and presumable lesson for posterity: in life and death, ends often justify the means.

     After two-and-a-quarter centuries the U.S. enjoyed the status as the pre-eminent superpower - the only superpower - capable of subduing the world with hot lead and warm ideals. 9/11 shattered that confidence, not because al-Qaeda represented an existential threat - it didn't then and surely does not today. Our paranoia was borne from a more pernicious fear of chaos. "When the world becomes uncertain, people feel that a once orderly place has become random. Randomness, when it concerns matters of life and death, of change and an uncertain future, is terrifying" (Ibid, 87). However shocking and disgusting the attacks on 9/11 were a priori, it was the perceived loss of control the U.S. experienced and the introduction into the U.S. hegemonic narrative of chaos that terrified the U.S. public. This rupture was compounded by our naive belief that we had succeeded in establishing a new world order after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, an order built by the U.S. and, for the foreseeable future, controlled by the U.S. While some added control did accrue to U.S. institutions, that development was not the cause but an effect of a power vacuum. Crucially, chaos as a force acting within the field of international relations could never - and will never - be eradicated.

     Al-Qaeda's attack was nothing more than a harbinger of a more chaotic field of unconventional forces working at the seams of an outdated system built upon Westphalian sovereignty. Asymmetric warfare as practiced by, inter alia, Hizballah and Hamas today is relied upon because these groups must redefine the rules of war. Up until the successful resistance of two Israeli invasions of souther Lebanon - in 1982 and 2006 -  separatist movements only succeeded at damage control. The Chechens were bombed into the Neolithic age during their second war with Russia. On the streets mean streets of Balbek in southern Lebanon, however, Hizballah used bottlenecks and blind-spots to effectively deploy their rocket forces. Hamas military victories have proven more allusive for other reasons, chiefly the overwhelming force applied to the Gaza Strip by the Israeli armed forces. And the 1983 U.S. Marines barracks bombing carried out by the cover group "The Free Islamic Revolutionary Movement," resulted in the deaths of 241 U.S. troops (It should be noted that at this time the U.S. had effectively sided with the Maronite coalition against the Shia' in the Lebanese Sectarian Civil War). The immediate result of this attack was the removal by the late President Reagan of U.S. Marines from Lebanese soil the following year. What were the costs to Hizballah from that attack? A single bomber's life, the name of which is to this day unknown. The truck and explosives cost the organization roughtly $1,500-$2,000. Hizballah had discovered a strategy that allowed them to even the odds with Israel and the U.S.

     This is not an attempt to either excuse the targeting of innocent civilians or accept the premise that resistance movements and dialogue are mutually exclusive options. Moreover, I suspect a majority of Hizballah and Hamas leaders share a similar distaste for plain murder and uncompromising militancy as well. Full disclosure: These groups have been guilty of atrocious acts of unwarranted violence. And yet, it's surprising why the West tries to differentiate between war writ large, and the atrocities perpetrated during war. War, for all intents and purposes, is the effort to extinguish life, and it is therefore expected that enemy combatants will err on the side of caution at the regrettable expense of acting immorally. Similar to the passage of time, Death waits for no man.

     Hizballah and Hamas either have been or currently are engaged in outright war with the West. It is telling, however that these groups have insisted upon operating within political frameworks, however imperfect the results. Neither these groups nor their benefactor, Iran, espouse the hatred typical of al-Qaeda. The former use militancy as a means to a political end, and grandstand to garner popular support (al-Qaeda's actions are not so subtle). Our forefathers did very much the same, and resistance movements will do the same not so much if they are able, but when they have no other choice.

     Those who insist that Hizballah lay down their weapons forget why they picked them up in the first place in 1982. And to lament Hamas' unwillingness to renounce violence as a precondition for negotiations with Israel and the U.S. is tantamount to laying the blame at the feet of David if he were to refuse the entreaties of moderates for him to lay down his sling before 'negotiating' with Goliath. "What am I to do," he would respond, "if a peaceful accord should prove allusive? Where then should I find safety if not from my sling?!" That 'moderate' precondition, however genuine, exposed him to the giant's sudden wrath the moment dialogue broke down.

     We must eradicate all forms of the word "Terrorism" from our political discussions. Each and every one of its forms are poisonous. Asymmetry is a far more appropriate substitute that at once conveys a useful description of reality while moderating the discussion so that an honest appraisal of contentious politics can take place. Asymmetry is an admission of weakness by a group with real political claims as they are confronted with an asymmetrical balance of conventional forces.


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